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Abstract
Christianity is plagued by two dualistic concepts: first, an ontological dualism that divides
the human person into body and soul, and second, an epistemological dualism that claims
science and theology are incompatible. However, these polarized (and polarizing) theological
frameworks are no longer sufficient, especially as scientific research provides new
understanding about the brain and human identity. The existence of the nonphysical soul has
long been called into question, thereby creating a theological crisis at the very core of
Christian belief: the resurrection. This thesis will examine the crisis as it manifests itself in
contemporary Christian society, pointing to the perpetuation of dualistic philosophies as the
source of a theological impasse. Finally, it will propose an interdisciplinary solution,
revisiting resurrection theology in dialogue with modern science, and providing a way
forward for those who seek a way both to participate in the resurrected life, and to proclaim
the promise of general resurrection without dismissing scientific research.
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Preface
Life is messy. And as I have come to find, life as a priest exposes one to a particular kind of
messiness: one that is honest about the raw physicality of birth and the irreversible finality of
death and the decay that follows. No doubt this is true for many others: for those who live
and die in poverty, for those who seek peace in the midst of armed conflict, and for those
employed as first responders, surgeons, and nurses.
The Christian narrative offers profound hope in the midst of this unending cycle of birth and
death: for the Christian, death does not have the last word. And yet, it seems, at times, that
our faith has blinded us from the holy certitude of death. Too often, I have witnessed
believers refuse to grieve the death of a loved one, claiming sure and certain hope in the
resurrection. Too often, I have known Christians to put more energy into religious piety than
into the relationships that surround them. Too often, I have watched as my community has
put aside the ways of peace, love, healing, and stewardship of creation for callings
considered to be more spiritual. And too often, I have prayed that God’s kingdom come, and
God’s will be done, without seriously considering what we mean when we claim this hope
“on earth, as it is in heaven.”
I began this work as an escape into the metaphysical: the works of John Polkinghorne, Ian
Barbour, and Arthur Peacocke were a welcome departure from what seemed to be an always
fleeting and often cruel experience in this physical plane of existence, and refreshing
evidence that science and theology could not only co-exist, but work together. What I did not
expect, as I moved into the world of human nature and our place in the cosmos, was to be
challenged with one simple question: do we need a soul?
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That question lies at the core of my thesis: I no longer believe that the non-physical soul is a
necessary element of human identity. And while that shift provides room for the theologian
to consider movement in the area of brain science, it seems that accepting a holistic and
material human identity is probably also closer to the views of the Ancient Hebrew
community and of some in the Early Church.
I offer this document to those who, whether due to education or the generation into which
they were born, find themselves caught between the worlds of religious tradition and
scientific questioning. I believe there is a middle way. I offer it to those who have seen the
minds of those they love decay or change, raising very real questions about the nature of the
soul and human identity. And I offer it to those committed to asking questions: what I
propose here is only one path, and one means of revisiting scripture and tradition, armed with
new knowledge.
This thesis is an answer to the question posed above: no, the soul is not necessary for
Christian belief. However, abandoning generations of belief is not without its caveats: the
Christian community has inherited many years of theology, music, and art centered around
the existence of a non-physical soul. For those who adopt Christian materialism, pastoral
concerns around those who maintain dualistic beliefs may outweigh the advantages that
interdisciplinary dialogue has to offer. As well, it should be noted that while abandoning the
need for a non-physical soul’s existence between the time of death and the General
Resurrection creates few theological problems for us, it raises some very real questions about
Jesus’ resurrection: was the earthly Jesus, fully human, a material being? Did Jesus, who was
also God, embody God’s Spirit? In what ways was the earthly Jesus different than humanity,
if at all? For our purposes, we will approach only the General Resurrection, leaving Jesus’
vi

resurrection to further studies around the ways Christology and Trinitarian theology might
relate to psycho-physical materialism.
Life is messy. It is raw, and it is physical. My hope is that this work might inspire us to
accept the permanence of death: a holy end to our God-given time on earth, until that time
when all of creation is made new. But I hope it might also challenge us to live in the ways of
the resurrected Christ, here and now.
Thy kingdom come,
Thy will be done,
On earth as it is in heaven.
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Chapter 1

1

The Problem

Before we can approach the theology of the resurrection, we must consider the soul.
Namely, what do we mean when we refer to the human soul? After identifying the
current state of confusion, this chapter will examine whether or not the existence of a
nonphysical soul can be rationalized by contemporary thought and the doctrine of
creation. It will argue that logic, science, and scripture point to humanity’s physical
identity: a material identity separate and distinct from that of its creator (who exists as
spirit), but with the unique physical ability to interact with that spirit.

1.1 The Problem of the Soul
Christians have a problem. That problem is, quite literally, a matter of life and death: it is
the resurrection.1 For without the theology of the resurrection, Christianity, at least in any
historically orthodox form, would cease to exist. In the words of Peter Carnley, who
defines Christianity as being post-Easter:
If anything it is the resurrection which is the foundation of the Church, its
worship and its theology, for the Church gathers not just around the
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This thesis refers specifically to the doctrine of the General Resurrection of the Body, considering the
Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth to be a separate matter.
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rehearsal of the story of the incarnation of God, but around perceived
presence of the raised Christ himself. (Carnley 1987, 8)
Indeed, Christianity is resurrection! And while Carnley speaks specifically to the
Church’s identity in the risen Jesus of Nazareth, one must also question how this Easter
faith is interpreted and lived out in the hope of the general resurrection. What happens
after death, and how can theologians reconcile their tradition with a growing body of
knowledge that suggests that the human brain is, in fact, the location of what we call the
soul? While the scientific community has moved ahead in its understanding of the human
person and its place in nature, the Church, by and large, has failed to respond
theologically. As a result, it finds itself ill-equipped to speak to a culture informed by
science, and especially to a new generation of educated youth.
David Kinnaman quotes one of these modern thinkers, in You Lost Me: Why Young
Christians Are Leaving Church... And Rethinking Faith:
To be honest, I think that learning about science was the straw that broke
the camel’s back. I knew from church that I couldn’t believe in both
science and God, so that was it. I didn’t believe in God anymore.”
(Kinnaman 2011, loc. 2141)
However, it seems that those leaving the Christian faith are not the only ones ill-equipped
to comprehend the soul, life after death, or the resurrection. In the book, Bodies and
Souls, or Spirited Bodies, Nancey Murphy shares the text of an informal quiz she often
gives when providing a lecture. The quiz asks the following:
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Which of the following comes closest to your understanding of human nature?
1. Humans are composed of one "part": a physical body
(materialism/physicalism).
2. Humans are composed of two parts:
2a. A body and a soul
2b. A body and a mind (dualism)
3. Humans are composed of three parts: body, soul, and spirit (trichotomism).
4. Humans are composed of one "part": a spiritual/mental substance (idealism).
5. Who cares? (Murphy 2006, 2-3)
Not surprisingly, Murphy reports that the results vary depending on the nature of her
audience. While scientists and liberal seminarians lean towards materialism, she notes
that both Evangelical students and (of particular interest for our purposes) general
audiences continuously provide dualistic or trichotomistic answers. And although she
suggests that the fifth answer, “who cares?” is likely the most accurate representation of
the biblical view, it seems both that the biblical witness may be more diverse and
complicated than we have come to understand (as will be explored in a later chapter), and
that Murphy’s fifth answer is unsatisfactory for the theologian, and as this chapter will
suggest, for the modern world.
Should the variety of answers surprise us? Perhaps not: Swinburne writes, “In more
modern times, the view that humans have souls has always been understood as the view
that humans have an essential part, separable from the body, as depicted by Plato and
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Aquinas” (Swinburne, Soul, nature and immortality of the). But why the confusion?
What has challenged the traditional dualistic view, which requires the existence of the
nonphysical and eternal soul? Robert Delfino looks to two revolutions in science:
The first revolution came from Charles Darwin. His theory of evolution,
though he did not use that word, raised serious questions about the origin
and nature of human beings. If humans evolved from non-human animals
it would seem that the difference between humans and other animals is
merely a matter of degree. In addition, if life itself emerged from nonliving matter, as some scientists have hypothesized, then appealing to a
nonphysical soul would seem to be superfluous. This view appears to be
reinforced by the second and currently occurring revolution, which comes
from neuroscience. Thanks to new discoveries about the brain, scientists
seem to be able to explain more and more of the functions that were once
attributed to the soul. (Delfino 2008)
Murphy, too, observes this conflict, concluding that our current understanding of the soul
needs further exploration and interdisciplinary dialogue:
A major part of current neuroscience research involves mapping the
regions of the brain (neuroanatomy) and studying the functions of the
various regions (neurophysiology). Studies of this sort intersect, in
fascinating ways, the philosophical issues canvassed above. First, they
provide dramatic evidence for physicalism. As neuroscientists associate
more and more of the faculties once attributed to mind or soul with the
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functioning of specific regions or systems of the brain it becomes more
and more appealing to say that it is in fact the brain that performs these
functions. (Murphy 1998a, 13)
Herein lies the problem: against growing evidence to the contrary, not only does a large
cross section of the general public perceive, for whatever reason, that the human person is
composed of something more than its physical properties, but the very resurrection
theology on which Christianity is built seems to depend on the existence of the nonphysical soul.

1.2

Are Science and Theology Incompatible? The
Historical Answer and its Legacy

Arthur Peacocke’s book, Creation and the World of Science: the Re-Shaping of Belief
begins with a section titled, “The Two Books.” While Peacocke points to a particular
dilemma regarding the use of textbooks in the public school system, his title suggests a
greater problem: for many, science and theology are seen as two opposing voices in
humanity’s quest to understand its own origin and purpose. While scientific research has
forced us to rethink the very composition of ourselves and of our world, many have
dismissed the traditional religious view: the doctrine of creation. Meanwhile, others
committed to upholding religious tradition have rejected commonly accepted scientific
theories and conclusions. The notion that science and theology possess irreconcilable
differences has polarized both the academic and religious worlds, as well as many who
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look to these places for direction. While this division is often cause for public and
political debate in the North American landscape, the problem is not a new one. A brief
survey of the historical conflict between science and theology reveals a conversation that
has remained at a virtual stalemate since it began.
Even in the early days of modern science, some in both camps were willing to see science
and theology as complementary, even natural partners.2 However, this view has always
called for reformation of both religious and scientific thought. Following a brief
examination of the current polarization, this chapter will survey some of the historical
conflicts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Specifically, it will consider the
compatibility of science with the Judeo-Christian theology of God as creator. Using these
historical accounts, it will demonstrate that current conflicts stem from an unresolved (or
at least unsatisfactorily resolved) problem in our history: namely, a presumption that a
dualistic understanding of creation is required for science and theology to be reconciled.
Peacocke begins his book with reference to the November 10, 1972 edition of the San
Francisco Chronicle. The newspaper had documented the results of a legal battle
regarding curriculum in the public school system: specifically, the lawsuit regarding the
inclusion or exclusion of the Genesis creation account from textbooks that favoured the
Darwinian theory of evolution. Rather than supporting either explanation, the courts
settled on a compromise. Peacocke quotes the article:

2

Speaking to van Huyssteen’s methodology, Randy L. Maddox observes, “The German word Wissenschaft
is often translated “science.” However, it is conceived to include all self–critical approaches to knowledge
and thus has a broader scope of meaning than is typically assigned to “science” in the Anglo-American
realm.” (Maddox 1984)
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The new guidelines would allow books to discuss the ‘how’ of man’s
origin but would prohibit them from mentioning ‘ultimate causes’ of life.
They would have to avoid, then, naming either God or the random
chemical reactions of several billion years ago that evolutionists say led to
living cells. (Peacocke 2004, 1)
Unfortunately, rather than paving the way for critical thought or the search for meaning
in schools, the verdict resulted in what could only be called an ignorant truce. For fear
that either traditional religious doctrine or commonly accepted scientific theories might
be promoted, schools were banned from exploring the question of the source of life. The
reasoning for the ban comes down to one concept, as resolved by the National Academy
of Sciences in that same year:
WHEREAS religion and science are, therefore, separate and mutually
exclusive realms of human thought whose presentation in the same context
leads to misunderstanding of both scientific theory and religious belief…
(Peacocke 2004, 2)
These same words could be used to describe the uneasy truce held by many scientists and
theologians today: a scientific explanation of the natural order is valid; the religious
account of creation is valid; however, both are exclusive and independent. Each
approach provides different answers because each approach asks different questions.
However, as the questions asked move beyond those easily answered by observation,
their differences become difficult to distinguish: how did humanity come to be; what is
the mechanism of human consciousness; what happens when we die?
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To support this uneasy truce, science and theology must be viewed as operating in two
separate planes or realms of existence: theology in the spiritual realm, and science in the
physical realm. If we are to accept the existence of both a physical realm and a spiritual
realm, our understanding of creation might provide the necessary framework for those
two conflicting realities to coexist. Barth seemed to support this mystical approach in his
reflections on “God the Creator”:
If we take this concept seriously, it must be at once clear that we are not
confronted by a realm which in any sense may be accessible to human
view or even to human thought. Natural science may be our occupation
with its view of development... but when could natural science have ever
penetrated to the fact that there is one world which runs through this
development? (Barth 1959, 51)
However, Peacocke rightly challenges this approach as one that is dependent on a
dualistic ontology. He notes that body-soul dualism is not only inadequate in regards to
our understanding of the natural world, but that it is inconsistent with the Christian
doctrine of creation, in that the only acceptable dualism exists between God and creation,
not within creation itself (Peacocke 2004, 24). We must ask ourselves: if our creeds
portray an undivided creator, can the same God be divided into the physical and spiritual?
Furthermore, can creation, and especially humanity, as created in God’s image, be
dualistic?
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In many ways, this struggle began in the seventeenth century, as Galileo sought to
understand his scientific observations in a world dominated by the picture of the universe
formed by Thomas Aquinas:
Earth was a fixed central sphere surrounded by the concentric spheres of
the heavens. Every entity... in the graded hierarchy of reality: God,
planets, angels, men, women, animals, and plants. It was a law-abiding
world, but the laws were moral and not mechanical. (Barbour 1997, 6)
More important for our current purposes,3 however, is the Thomistic understanding of
God’s relationship with the world. In this cosmological argument, God the creator is the
cause of all that exists. Furthermore, God exists as the “continuing ruler of nature,” rather
than simply as its original creator (Barbour 1997, 8).
As Galileo began to challenge the historical understanding of the earth and the heavens,
he did so with a particular consideration of and respect for the scriptures. However, his
proposal suggested not only a departure from the old cosmological model, but also a
departure from the medieval understanding of God as continuing ruler (Barbour 1997,
15-16). Furthermore, Galileo’s observations called into question the literal interpretation
of scripture that supported the hierarchical and geocentric model of creation. As he drew
criticism from the religious and political leaders of his day, Galileo’s explanation was
quite similar to the modern approach discussed earlier in this paper: he claimed that
theology and science have different goals and stand independent of one another.

3

Aquinas’ views on the soul will be explored in chapter 2.1.
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However, to rationalize his argument, he leaned on the theologian whose work was the
basis for the Western world’s cosmological model: Thomas Aquinas.
It follows that since the Holy Ghost did not intend to teach us whether
heaven moves or stands still... so much the less was it intended to settle for
us any other conclusion of the same kind... Now if the Holy Spirit has
purposely neglected to teach us propositions of this sort as irrelevant to the
highest goal (that is, our salvation), how can anyone affirm that it is
obligatory to take sides on them? (Barbour 1997, 14)
Newton followed in Galileo’s footsteps, proclaiming a morally ordered universe,
designed by God, and left to the governance of human reason. Newton’s God was present
in the world through both the designed order, and the presence of humanity (Barbour
1997, 24). But it was not until the eighteenth century that the worlds of science and
religion were truly separated, in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant proposed that
limitations in the scientific method left room for religious belief (Barbour 1997, 45), and
proposed a coexistence of the two through a ‘division of labour.’ According to Kant,
religion did not need to defend its gaps to the scientific community, and science did not
need to reconcile its observations with the mysteries of faith (Barbour 1997, 46).
Later that century, John Wesley penned the preface to Milton’s Survey of the Wisdom of
God in Creation: or a Compendium of Natural Philosophy. In his introduction, Wesley
praised the work of the natural sciences for displaying “the invisible things of God, his
power, wisdom, and goodness” (Milton 1770, iii). Yet as he went on, Wesley supported
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the view that science and theology coexist independently of one another, and without
threat:
It will be easily observed, that I endeavour throughout, not to account for
things, but only to describe them. I undertake barely to set down what
appears in nature, not the cause of those appearances. (Milton 1770, v-vi)
While at times, the tension between science and theology in our modern age seems to be
at a peak, a brief survey of history reveals that this tension has long since existed.
Moreover, the common solution cited in our world, which claims religion and science
both ask and answer different questions or operate in different realms, seems to be no
more than the evolution of a solution offered in one form or another since the beginning
of the conflict.
Where does that leave us? Nancey Murphy describes the situation well:
It is undeniable that a serious theological problem awaits a solution.
Philosophers see dualism as no longer tenable; the neurosciences have
completed the Darwinian revolution, bringing the entire human being
under the purview of the natural sciences. Scientists and philosophers
alike associate dualism with Christianity, and the “evangelical atheists”
among them (such as Daniel Dennett) use these specific and philosophical
developments as potent apologetic tools. (Murphy 1998a, 24)
If we are to accept Peacocke’s claim that these answers result in a dualism incompatible
with Judeo-Christian belief, then we might also assume that as science continues to
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explore the natural world in greater and greater detail, the tension will only increase. And
if that is the case, there seem to be only two solutions: either science and theology are
irreconcilable, or, as I will suggest in a later chapter, we must consider a new model for
dialogue.

1.3 Does the Nonphysical Soul Exist?
C.S. Lewis is often quoted as having said, “You don’t have a soul; you are a soul. You
have a body.” In fact, despite the absence of these words in any of his books, and the lack
of any other credible source, contemporary religious media and Internet sources show no
hesitation in attributing the quote to Lewis. These words, whatever their source, have
struck a chord with humanity: so much so that they have become what Dawkins would
call a meme:
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways
of making pots or building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in
the meme pool by leaping from body to body via sperm or eggs, so memes
propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from brain to brain via a
process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation. (Dawkins
2006b, 192)
And while this seemingly viral idea has been propagated culturally, its popularity has
little to say about whether or not it is true. Dawkins describes this phenomenon using
what he calls “the god meme”:
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Remember that ‘survival value’ here does not mean value for a gene in a
gene pool, but value for a meme in a meme pool. The question really
means: What is it about the idea of a god that gives it its stability and
penetrance in the cultural environment? The survival value of the god
meme in the meme pool results from its great psychological appeal. It
provides a superficially plausible answer to deep and troubling questions
about existence. (Dawkins 2006b, 193)
And yet, whether or not cultural memes hold any scientific merit, whether or not they are
theologically valid, or whether or not the meme in question can be attributed to anyone,
these words reveal something important about society: people need to understand who
and what they are, and as our cultural understanding of the human person changes,
respected voices of authority are called upon to clarify new developments. The words’
popularity points to a dilemma unique to the religious world: as science progresses,
modern persons of faith crave a new or more developed understanding of what we mean
when we refer to the soul. And while the words quoted suggest a departure from the
traditional understanding of soul (i.e. secondary to the physical being), it maintains a
dualistic understanding of human ontology. This should strike us as odd, for the notion
conflicts with both the scientific mind and the religious mind. Modern science would
explain emotion, creativity, and even religious experience as functions of the brain.
Likewise, regardless of popular religious views, humanity cannot be understood to be
dualistic in nature, given its creation in the image of an undivided God.
What, then, is the soul? Does it describe a uniquely nonphysical part of the human
person, or does it, instead, describe the metaphysical functions of the brain? Is the
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concept of soul nothing more than an historical understanding of human identity that
science has made obsolete? And finally, if the soul turns out to be nothing more than a
function of the human brain, then what are the religious implications?
In a debate hosted by The Guardian, Richard Dawkins introduced two definitions. The
first, he distinguished as ‘soul one’:
It’s the theory that there is something non-material about life, some nonphysical vital principle. It’s the theory according to which a body has to be
animated by some anima. Vitalized by a vital force. Energized by some
mysterious energy. Spiritualized by some mysterious spirit. Made
conscious by some mysterious thing or substance called consciousness...
In the sense of Soul One, science has either killed the soul or it is in the
process of doing so. (Radford 1999)
Dawkins suggests that all definitions of ‘soul one’ are both circular and non-productive,
and counters this understanding with ‘soul two’:
“…intellectual or spiritual power. High development of the mental
faculties. Also, in somewhat weakened sense, deep feeling, sensitivity.”
(Radford 1999)
He is not, of course, describing the existence of two different souls, but of two different
understandings, the first of which he dismisses as false. To Dawkins, no part of the
human person exists beyond its physical form. To Dawkins, the word “soul” describes
only the higher functions of the brain.
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Others, like Richard Swinburne, support a dualistic understanding of human identity.
Adopting Descartes’ explanation, Swinburne proposes a model which resembles
Dawkins’ “soul one,” or what Gilbert Ryle cleverly calls “the ghost in the machine”
(Ryle 2009, 5-6).
The body is separable from the person and the person can continue even
after the body is destroyed. Just as I continue to exist wholly and
completely if you cut off my hair, so, the dualist holds, it is possible that I
continue to exist if you destroy my body... The person is the soul together
with whatever, if any, body is linked temporarily to it. (Swinburne 1997)
The notion that a person is composed of both body and soul, but may continue to exist
even without the body, is not a new one, having been most effectively realized by
Thomas Aquinas, as will be explored in a later chapter. But to the modern mind,
Swinburne’s reasoning may seem illogical. Cutting one’s hair seems to be different than
cutting one’s soul (if there is such a thing). But what of cutting one’s brain? What of
recent developments in neurotheology, like the work of Andrew Newberg, that draws
connections between religious ritual and healing in the brain (Anastasi and Newberg
2008; Moss, et al. 2012)? After all, if Dawkins is correct, and if the soul is simply a
function of the brain, then the human person is necessarily connected to the body—
because the human person is the body. If the body dies, the person no longer exists.
In his logic, Swinburne has considered these things. He notes the known continuity of the
human person after surgery: specifically, after the transplant of any part, save the brain.
However, here he seems to side with Dawkins, identifying the brain as the core of human
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function, and the core of human identity. Swinburne concludes simply: “I go where my
brain goes” (Swinburne 1997, II, 8).4 Yet the location of the person becomes more
complicated as neuroscience progresses. One must take into account the possibility of
survival after stroke or injury to the brain. Experience tells us that even if part of the brain
dies or is removed, the person remains: even in cases of removal of an entire hemisphere,
or injuries causing significant disability, the person retains a sense of continuity, or self.5
Swinburne takes this one step further, asking what would result from the transplant of an
entire hemisphere, were it possible. Would the person (and for our purposes, the soul)
remain with the donor, leaving the recipient soulless, or would the person/soul be
transferred to the recipient? In the latter case, would the procedure result in two identical
individuals/souls, or would the soul be divided?
This, I will propose, is where Swinburne’s theory begins to break down. As he considers
the possibility of the divided mind, he leans to Bernard Williams’ essay, The Self and the
Future (Williams 1970). By transposing William’s dilemma to the question at hand,
Swinburne claims to prove that “there is something other to the continuity of the person,
than any continuity of parts of brain or body” (Swinburne 1997, II, 8). The proposal is
simple:

4

While Swinburne’s logic is faulty, brain transplants may not be impossible. In her book, Stiff: The
Curious Lives of Human Cadavers, Mary Roach documents a series of dog and monkey head transplants
conducted by Vladimir Demikhov in the 1950s, and by Robert White in the 1960s. In 1971, White
transplanted the head of one monkey on to the body of a second, observing “Each cephalon [head] gave
evidence of the external environment… The eyes tracked the movement of individuals and objects brought
into their visual fields, and the cephalons remained basically pugnacious in their attitudes as demonstrated
by their biting if orally stimulated.” (Roach 2004, loc 2657-2733).
5

Swinburne agrees that this is the case, as proven in (the now dated) S. P. Springer and G. Deutsch, Left
Brain, Right Brain, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1981
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Suppose that a mad surgeon captures you and announces that he is going
to transplant your left cerebral hemisphere into one body, and your right
one into another. He is going to torture one of the resulting persons and
free the other with the gift of a million pounds. You can choose which
hemisphere [sic] is to be tortured and which to be rewarded... but you do
not know which resultant person will be you. (Swinburne 1997, II, 8)
Due to the obvious fear and confusion such a situation would bring about, Swinburne
draws on Williams’ own conclusion:
This seems to show that to care about what happens to me in the future is
not necessarily to care about what happens to this body (the one I now
have); and this in turn might be taken to show that in some sense of
Descartes’ obscure phrase, I and my body are “really distinct.” (Williams
1970, 164-165)
It is Swinburne’s claim that this theoretical uncertainty allows one to conclude that there
is more to the human person than the sum of its parts, and that this, in turn, allows for a
dualistic understanding of body/soul.6 However, Williams himself admits that his own

6

In light of this conclusion, it is worth making of note of Warren Brown’s suggestion that the human
capacity for personal relatedness creates that which is semantically called “soul.” Brown avoids dualism by
presenting the soul as an emergent property of cognitive ability: “a unique mode of functioning that
becomes possible on the basis of both a significant increase in the capacity of some lower-level abilities
and the interaction among these capacities… the emergent property cannot be understood by close scrutiny
of the lower abilities, nor can the behaviour in the realm of the emergent property be totally accounted for
using the descriptive concepts of lower-level phenomena.” (Brown 1998a, loc. 1423) While this proposed
“non-reductive physicalism” works, one wonders if it might more clearly be named emergent
physicalism/materialism. Furthermore, some materialists will remain unsatisfied by a materialism that
leaves room for the mystical or ineffable.
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conclusion does not allow for the person to exist without a body! Furthermore, both have
made theoretical conclusions based on theoretical situations that bring about an emotional
reaction—one that may or may not be logical. That one cares about the possibility that
their person (in whatever form) may suffer in no way implies that said person exists
separate from the body. To fear being tortured as either Williams’ A-body-person or Bbody-person cannot, in itself, lead us to the conclusion that the person exists outside of
the body. In either case, the fear is torture. In either case, it would be experienced by both
the physical body and the person (especially if we are unable to distinguish between the
two). Finally, both Williams’ and Swinburne’s proposals elicit emotional responses to
theoretical and (currently) impossible situations. Swinburne’s conclusion is not dissimilar
to suggesting that fear of eternal damnation proves the existence of hell, or that fear of
hell proves the existence of the soul. By attempting to confirm the existence of the soul in
a dualistic manner, Swinburne has stepped outside of what is logical. By attempting to
explain an abstract concept in a logical manner, he has resorted to the imaginary. It seems
that in this case, like in the case of proving the existence of God, logic meets its
limitations: just as it can neither prove nor disprove the existence of God, it can neither
prove nor disprove body/soul dualism. In fact, using logic to make such universal claims
has a certain danger: the argument bears the risk of becoming either illogical (like the
argument above), or so abstract that it confuses the issue, as demonstrated by John Allen
Paulos in this apocryphal story:
Catherine the Great had asked the famous French philosopher Denis
Diderot to her court, but was distressed to discover that Diderot was a
vocal atheist. To counter him, she asked the visiting mathematician
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Leonhard Euler to confront Diderot. On being told that there was a new
argument for God’s existence, the innumerate Frenchman expressed a
desire to hear it. Euler then strode forward and stated, “Sir, (a+bn)/n=x.
Hence God exists. Reply.” Having no understanding of math, Diderot is
reported to have been so dumbfounded he left for Paris. (Paulos 2008, 43)
Here, it seems worth drawing a parallel to where similar conversations are taking place in
the field of philosophy. Specifically, around what David Chalmers calls “the hard
problem of consciousness”. Chalmers writes,
It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the
question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is
perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual
and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory
experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can
we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or
to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a
physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so
arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?
It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. (Chalmers
1995)
Chalmers differentiates these secondary or emergent properties from the “easy
problems:” phenomena that can be explained scientifically:
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the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental
stimuli;



the integration of information by a cognitive system;



the reportability of mental states;



the ability of a system to access its internal states;



the focus of attention;



the deliberate control of behaviour;



the difference between wakefulness and sleep. (Chalmers 1995)

Others, like Murphy’s interlocutor, Daniel C. Dennett, believe that Chalmers is inflating
the problem, and that the hard problem of consciousness could, in fact, be explained once
the easy problem is better understood. Dennett compares the necessity for the hard
problem to create something out of nothing to magic:
Any bag of tricks in the brain just couldn’t be consciousness, not real
consciousness. But even those who don’t make this preemptive mistake
often have a weakness for exaggerating the phenomenon of consciousness.
(Dennett 2013, 313)
Finally, Robert Wright summarizes the materialist’s problem with not only the hard and
soft problems of consciousness, but with consciousness itself:
In my view, the problem here is that consciousness is “identical” to
physical brain states. The more Dennett et al. try to explain to me what
they mean by this, the more convinced I become that what they really
believe is that consciousness doesn’t exist. (R. Wright 2001, 308)
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What, then, remains? A growing body of evidence seems to point to the existence of the
person, and therefore what we would call the soul, within the human brain. While this
creates a number of theological problems in areas from free will to morality, the
immediate concern for our purposes is that of the eternal soul. Namely, this: if what we
refer to as the soul exists within the brain itself, and if we cannot accept Swinburne’s (or
Aquinas’) rationale for the existence of the soul aside from the body, then what becomes
of the soul at the time of death? Logic would suggest that when the brain dies, the soul
dies. And this presents us with a theological crisis. Popular Christian understandings of
the afterlife must be called into question. Concepts like ‘the communion of saints’ are no
longer feasible, at least in the way they once were. What I will propose is not a new
understanding, but an old one. It is a return to the basics of the Christian faith—because
problematic understandings of the soul most likely spring from inherited tradition rather
than from scripture itself. As Murphy points out,
…there is an increasing consensus that neither dualism nor trichotomism
is to be found in the Hebraic or Christian Scriptures. Instead, interpreters,
working in light of later dualist theories of human nature, have read
dualism back into the texts, and the texts have been translated this way
into modern languages. (Murphy 2013, 12)
To begin, we must acknowledge that a dualistic human ontology cannot be reconciled
with the doctrine of creation. Calling, again, on Peacocke, the only acceptable dualism
exists between God and creation. God is not divided. Creation is not divided. Humanity,
created in the image of an undivided God, cannot be dualistic (Peacocke 2004, 24). If we
accept that this is true, we can also accept the possibility that the entirety of human
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capacity is realized in its physical form. Such a departure from dualism allows the
Christian to accept the possibility that what we call the soul may, in fact, be a physical
function of the human brain.
In terms of death and general resurrection, it is prudent to return to the scriptures. Ted
Peters points us to the epistles of the apostle Paul as we consider the soul (T. Peters 2003,
293-317). Paul, in his letters, considered death and resurrection as necessary elements of
the Christian life. However, the modern concept of the eternal soul seems . Peters writes,
“For Paul, there is no abiding life force at all that perdures through death” (T. Peters
2003, 306).
N.T. Wright supports this claim, confirming that for Paul, not only was resurrection most
certainly a bodily one, but that his culture had no concept of what we might call a
nonphysical soul:
There was, in any case, no indication in Judaism either before or after Paul
that ‘resurrection’ could mean anything other than ‘bodily’… we should
not assume that the ontological dualism between what modern westerners
since Descartes at least think of as ‘physical’ and ‘spiritual’, or ‘material’
and ‘non-material’, would have meant very much to Paul’s audiences.
Most pagan philosophers of the period who believed in the existence of
souls would have thought that they, like the body, were composed of
material, albeit in finer particles (N. Wright 2003, loc 6395).
For the Early Christians, life was life. Death was death. Sharing in Christ’s resurrection
was miraculous not because the believers’ eternal souls would be reunited with their
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bodies, but because they who were fully dead would experience new birth! Peters calls us
to Paul’s use of eschatological images: “what you sow does not come to life unless it
dies” (1 Cor. 15:36), explaining that “resurrection is not exactly creation out of nothing,
but creation of something out of something else. A dead seed is sown, but what is
harvested is new life” (T. Peters 2003, 307). Joel Green writes,
How are we capable of traversing from life to life-after-death? Simply put,
we are not. The capacity for resurrection, for transformed existence, is not
a property intrinsic to the human person (nor to the created cosmos). That
is, as Paul emphasizes, God’s doing. (Green 2008, 178)
The permanence of death was not a new concept for the Early Church, but was in many
ways inherited from Judaism: a religious tradition that, like Christianity, carried a welldeveloped resurrection theology. But as Jon D. Levenson explains, the Classical Jewish
doctrine of resurrection depended on death in its fullness:
…the finality and irreversibility of death is in fact, everywhere the belief.
On this reading, the position of the Hebrew Bible is nicely and
exhaustively stated by the wise woman of Tekoa to King David, “We must
all die; we are like water that is poured out on the ground and cannot be
gathered up.” (2 Sam 14:14) (Levenson 2006, 167)
Joel Green expands on the importance of the physicality of both human life and death by
reminding us that personhood need not be defined only by its physical form, but by the
way the human person interacts with the rest of creation: in the very social relations that
define human identity. That is particularly important when we consider death, because
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death marks not only the loss of the material person, but of the relationships that define
that person’s identity:
This means, second, that death must be understood not only in biological
terms, as merely the cessation of one’s body, but as the conclusion of
embodied life, the severance of all relationships, and the fading of
personal narrative. It means that, at death, the person really dies; from the
perspective of our humanity and sans divine intervention, there is no part
of us, no aspect of our personhood, that survives death. (Green 2008, 178)
While what I suggest may seem to be a departure from both historical and contemporary
Christian tradition, it seems that leaving dualistic ontology behind is not only faithful to
much of historical Christian and Hebrew doctrine, but that it also solves the mystery of
the soul’s location. And while the Early was diverse in its understanding, one can read in
Paul’s letters the certainty of death, and hope for a new creation in the resurrection. In
that light, how we might reinterpret the theology of resurrection, and how it might
manifest itself in the Christian community will be explored in the final chapters.7

7

It seems important, at this intersection, to observe that this dilemma is not unique to theology’s body/soul
dualism, but to philosophy’s mind/brain dualism. Daniel C. Dennett writes, “scientists and philosophers
may have achieved a consensus of sorts in favor of materialism, but as we shall see, getting rid of the old
dualistic visions is harder than contemporary materialists have thought. Finding suitable replacements for
the traditional dualistic images will require some rather startling adjustments to our habitual ways of
thinking, adjustments that will be just as counterintuitive at first to scientists as to laypeople.” (Dennett,
Consciousness Explained, 37)
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Chapter 2

2

How Did We Get Here?

In the first chapter, I noted that while scientific research may have brought us closer to
understanding both the location and function of what we call the soul, it has also resulted
in a departure from ancient beliefs that may, in fact, be easier to reconcile with the
sciences than current religious views (T. Peters 2003).8 It seems fitting, then, to question
the historical sources which have informed our theology, especially as such conflicts
arise.
If Pauline Christianity did not support the concept of the eternal soul, then how did bodysoul dualism become so prevalent in Christian theology? This chapter will look to one
significant voice in the Church’s definition of the soul: Thomas Aquinas. It will also look
to the Hebrew Scriptures, in search of understanding regarding the theology regarding
death and resurrection that the Early Church might have inherited from the Jewish
tradition.

2.1 Thomas Aquinas and the Soul
The classical view of the human soul is one that developed over time: Plato’s dualistic
theory of forms established a model where matter was ultimately superseded by form.

8

Ted Peters observes that Pauline Christianity does not support the existence in an immortal soul, except
through the miracle of the resurrection.
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Aristotle’s response was one that aimed to unite matter and form in a way that both could
coexist. “One of the most significant features of the problem of the soul in the thirteenth
century,” writes Anton Charles Pegis, “is the evidence it gives of the resistance of
Christian thought to Aristotle” (Pegis 1978, 121). It was within this environment that
Thomas Aquinas considered the soul, and ultimately turned from Aristotle’s united model
to one that more closely reflected Platonic dualism:
That intimate union between soul and body, which seemed to rob the soul
of all its native glory and to reduce it to the status of the form of the body,
is a doctrine which… did not please the early as well as (for the most part)
the late nineteenth century. Under such circumstances it was natural to
turn to Plato, and St. Thomas himself has outlined the difficulties which
led to such a solution. But in thus safeguarding the substantial character of
the soul and its radical independence of the body, Christian thought was
open to the charge of endangering the unity of man. (Pegis 1978, 121)
What follows is the Thomistic view, as described in Summa Theologiae. By surveying his
Treatise on Man, this chapter will explore Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the soul,
and its relationship to the human body, making note of Thomas’ reliance on dualism, and
how the Summa continues to influence modern Christian thought (Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologica I, Q. 75-102).
Thomas described the soul as the “first principle” of all living things: that which animates
life (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 75, Art. 1). Life, as he described it, may be observed in both
knowledge and movement. But what of the soul? One might argue that the soul, without
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physical form, may be observed in neither knowledge nor movement. However, Aquinas
made a clear distinction between the body, which acts, and the soul, which causes the
body to act. The human person, as he understood it, was composed of both soul and body.
It seems to follow that the body does not possess life independent of the soul: if the soul
is the first principle of life, the without the soul, the body is lifeless—dead. And yet,
Aquinas did allow for the possibility that the soul could exist without the body. The
human soul, as he described it, is nonphysical. And though it is separable and selfsubsistent, without the body, the soul is an incomplete human (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 75,
Art. 4).
Lest we risk misreading the Summa, it is important to understand what, exactly, Aquinas
referred to by the word “soul”. Though he described the soul as existing without matter
(Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 75, Art. 5), Aquinas did not refer to a mystical or apparitional quality
in the modern sense of the word, but rather to “the principle of intellectual operation”
(Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 75, Art. 2). He was careful, however, to separate this principle from
the human body, noting the necessity of objectivity in understanding:
Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own
nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge
of anything else… therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the
nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. (Aquinas, Sum I,
Q. 75, Art. 2)
For Thomas, the human soul alone was subsistent (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 75, Art. 3). In
regards to the souls of animals, he drew on the works of Plato, who made a distinction
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between the intellect and sensory apparatus, and of Aristotle, who maintained that
understanding is performed without corporeal action (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 75, Art. 3).
Animals, as Aquinas understood them, were sensory creatures that did not share these
subsistent and separable intellectual properties of humans.
Thomas also made an important distinction between the human soul and the angel,
clarifying a perceived similitude that continues to our present age. He proposed that both
the angel and the soul are nonphysical, and acknowledged the argument that proposed the
soul and the angel are of the same species, based on the assumption that the two do not
differ aside from the soul’s union with the body (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 75, Art. 7). But here,
he reminded the reader that those things with different natural operations, as is the case
with the angel and the soul, are necessarily of different species. Meanwhile, Thomas
further separated the human soul and the angel in terms of intellect: the human soul, of
varied and indeterminate intellectual capacity, and the angel, of superior intellectuality
and moral knowledge.
However, while Aquinas was keen to separate the human body and soul, he did not allow
for either to define the human person independently:
The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by nature of its
essence can be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul
alone, but the “composite,” is the species. (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 75, Art. 7)
The paradox of both this separation and composite nature created a number of problems,
which Thomas addressed in logical fashion.
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One such problem presented itself in the number of souls present among human beings.
As already stated, Aquinas understood the soul to be immaterial. According to the logic
of his day, an immaterial substance within a species could not be multiplied. However,
the alternative would suggest that all humans share one soul, a principle Thomas called
absurd, as it conflicted with the diversity present in humanity (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 76,
Art. 2). Another problem was found in the very nature of the body and soul’s unity: for if
the soul is incorruptible, but the body is not, the two might seem to be incompatible. To
rationalize this inconsistency, Thomas forwent his usual logic, and leaned on his
theology: “God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the
gift of grace” (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 76, Art. 5).
In one of the most interesting sections of the Treatise on Man, Aquinas considered
whether the soul was present in each part of the body. It had been proposed that the soul’s
presence was not necessary in all parts of the body: specifically, the soul was neither
needed nor present in parts of the body thought to be inorganic (Aquinas, Sum 1, Q. 76,
Art. 8). Thomas admit that different parts of the body (the ear, eye, etc.) possessed
different powers, each granted by the soul. However, no part, he observed, seemed to
have complete access to the power rooted in the soul’s essence: the eye could not hear,
and the ear could not see (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 76, Art. 8). Likewise, each part of the body
relied on the other parts of the body to accomplish that which it could not, rather than
being granted all powers by the soul. These observations do seem to support the nonpresence of the soul in the body’s entirety. However, they do not suggest in which, or in
how many parts the soul may be located. But Thomas sided with Augustine, who said
that “in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire”
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(Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 76, Art. 8). He went on to explain that the soul is united to the body
as its form, and therefore can neither be divided, nor be present in only certain parts. He
stressed that any animal (and therefore any human) is composed of both the soul and the
whole body: part of an animal is not an animal (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 76, Art. 8). Finally,
Aquinas clarified the aforementioned observations by noting that the powers of the soul
exceeded those of the body’s parts: most interestingly, the soul’s powers of intellect and
will, neither of which were believed to be present in any part of the body.
Thomas perceived the soul to have five distinct powers: intellectual, locomotive,
appetitive, sensitive, and vegetative. He described these powers as existing within a
particular hierarchy. He named the soul’s first operation, not performed by any corporal
organ, as that best reflecting God’s image (though lower in perfection than the intellect of
either God or angels), the rational soul. Below this was the sensory soul, observing the
qualities of the physical world—in many ways that which bridged the rational and
vegetative soul. Finally, and least honorable, the vegetative soul, which by intrinsic
principle, caused the operation of corporeal functions (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 78, Art. 1, 2).
Of most interest for our purposes is the intellectual soul, for according to Aquinas, it is
this intellectual operation that sets humanity apart. This intellectual power was
understood to be passive, due to its potentiality: until the intellectual soul acts, it
possesses only the potential to understand (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 79, Art. 1, 2). However,
Aquinas allowed for an active intellect as well, noting that although the soul responds
passively to sensibilities outside itself, the action of abstracting these sensibilities is
necessary for understanding (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 79, Art. 3, 4).
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Memory, as Thomas described it, cannot be separated from the intellect, but rather serves
as the soul’s power of retention. “Intelligence,” said Aquinas, “arises from memory, as
act from habit” (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 79, Art. 7). However, he divided what we call
memory into two parts: first, memory as knowledge, and second, sensory memory. For
Aquinas, memory as knowledge was contained in the intellectual part of the soul, but
sensory memory, having no understanding, was separate from the intellect (Aquinas, Sum
I, Q. 79, Art. 6).
This transition from potential to knowledge, which we call reasoning, was not distinct
from the Thomistic intellect. By the powers of the intellect, Thomas said, “…man arrives
at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another, and
therefore he is called rational” (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 79, Art. 8). This, he believed, was a
power unique to humanity. It was not shared by other animals, nor was it shared by
angels, who knew truth in full, without this process of reasoning. Therefore, concluded
Aquinas, human knowledge (by way of reasoning) could be described as imperfect, as
compared to the perfect knowledge of the angels (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 79, Art. 8).
Finally, we must take note of Aquinas’ contributions in regards to the conscience. For as
one considers the relationship between the body and the soul, moral and ethical issues
arise. Especially as one considers the human person in respect to Aquinas’ (or our own)
religious framework, the conscience arises with particular importance. Thomas observed
that conscience implies the very act described above: reasoning based on experience and
knowledge, and application of that knowledge to something else.
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Summarized simply, “knowledge applied to an individual case” (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 79,
Art. 13). Here, Thomas connected what we call the conscience to the soul, as an
intellectual operation. However, this connection also made a particularly important
distinction: the conscience, as he described it, is a function of the human person, rather
than a seamless and mystical connection to higher truth. The conscience, therefore, can
be denied or ignored. Thus, Thomas concluded that the conscience must be described as
an act of the soul, rather than as a power of the soul, as powers are concrete and
inescapable (Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 79, Art. 13). However, while Aquinas made a strong
case for the development of conscience through reason (which would result in a variety
of consciences based on differing knowledge and experience), he fell back on the concept
of a universal truth inherent in first principles:
Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many,
nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first
principles, which is called “synderesis.” And for this special reason, this
habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above. 9, 10
(Aquinas, Sum I, Q. 79, Art. 13)

9

The term synderesis is thought to have been introduced in a passage in St. Jerome’s Commentary on
Ezekiel. Further, as Douglas Kries reports, “most scholars acknowledge that the appearance of synderesis in
the medieval manuscripts of Jerome’s commentary is in all likelihood a corruption of the Greek work
syneidēsis, which is the standard correlate in Greek Patristic literature for the Latin conscientia. (Kries
2002)
10

A good example of this concept’s influence on modern theology is found in Roger Scruton’s The Soul of
the World. Scruton writes, “…the overreaching intentionality of interpersonal responses presents us with
meanings that transcend the domain of any natural science. The “order of the covenant” emerges from the
“order of nature” in something like the way the face emerges from the flesh or the movement of tones from
the sequence of sounds in music. It is not an illusion or fabrication, but a “well-founded phenomenon,” to
use the idiom of Leibniz. It is out there and objectively perceivable, as real as any feature of the natural
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For today’s theologian, a greater understanding of Thomas Aquinas’ perception of the
human soul seems to be quite important. Whether we are aware of it or not, these
classical views continue to shape our understanding: in the Church, in the academy, and
in the general public (both religious and non-religious). The common dualistic
understanding of body and soul, or the normative Christian (and secular) belief in the
immortal soul are widespread, as noted in the first chapter of this paper.
The neurological sciences have suggested that those human functions once associated
with the soul are, in fact, functions of the human brain. This, perhaps, is the basis of all
conflict with the classical view. For while Thomas went so far as to suggest that
soul=mind=intellect, he did not go so far as to suggest that soul=brain. And if that is true,
many of the classical assumptions and conclusions that follow become invalid. For
instance, Aquinas’ soul is entirely dependent on its nonphysical existence. The notion
that the brain is responsible for human intellect and reasoning throws the Summa into
disarray.
First, questions regarding the eternal and incorruptible soul become very real: for if the
location of intellectual function is, in fact, corporeal, then it follows that the soul may
also be damaged. A corporeal soul may be injured, or killed. What then, becomes of the
soul? Does the soul die? In the case of injury or dementia, does the victim become an
incomplete human? Do those that heal lose their soul, only to take on another?

world. So it is, at least, for the self-conscious subject; for all other sentient creatures, however, the order of
the covenant is invisible, unknowable, irrelevant.” (Scruton 2014, 175)
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Second, one must question the implications of corporeal intellectual functions in relation
to the uniqueness of humanity among all of creation. If the intellect is a physical function,
then one must conclude either that it is a physical function that non-human animals are
incapable of performing, that there is some other aspect separating humanity from the rest
of the animal kingdom, spiritual or otherwise, or that humans are simply not as unique as
we once perceived. One need only look to recent research in animal intelligence to find
that we are not the only species capable of critical thought, reason, logic, or emotion.
Chimpanzees, parrots, and even cuttlefish have challenged our assumptions about
intellectual superiority. Nancey Murphy writes,
To claim that humans alone have the gift of a soul seems to force an
arbitrary distinction where there is much evidence to the contrary.”
(Murphy 1998a, 12)
If we lean, as some do, on our ability to conduct moral reasoning as evidence for human
uniqueness, we may find ourselves challenged by Thomas’ description of the conscience
as a corporeal act of the intellect. What, then, makes the human unique? How might we
interpret creation in God’s image? Furthermore, how will new interpretations of the
eternal soul and eternal life take other species into account?
Finally, Aquinas’ conclusion that the soul may not be divided is hard to square with the
idea that the brain is the body’s intellectual centre. For if it is true that the soul is present
in the entire body, we must also question what happens when the body is divided. In
Thomas’ day, this occurrence may have been as simple as losing a leg in war, a child
losing a tooth, or even cutting one’s hair. Does part of the soul leave the body in these
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instances? Does the amputee become an incomplete human (one assumes that our answer
to this question has evolved)? Does the severed leg or tooth retain some of the soul?
While Thomas’ definition of the human person calls for both body and soul, his
definition of body does not seem to account for the diversity of physical states now
accepted as being fully human.11 Many other questions stem from this concept of the
united soul: is the brain the most (or only) honorable part of the human body, or does
knowledge of its corporeal status render the intellect dishonorable? Do organ transplants
move one soul into another body, or does the donor organ adopt the soul present in its
new body? As discussed in an earlier chapter, how does hemisphere division or
electroconvulsive therapy change matters? Finally, were it possible, would a partial brain
transplant move one soul into another body, and if so, would the patient then be a
combination of two souls?
To the modern mind, this portrayal of the soul raises many questions. And while it is true
that Aquinas developed on the dualistic philosophies that preceded him, it is also worth
noting that Thomistic dualism was not without opposition. In the early 14th century, Pope
John XXII expressed serious doubts regarding the location of the soul after death,
preaching that the beatific vision could not be experienced until the final resurrection.12

11

Joel Green considers the problem, and those it creates for the resurrection, through modern eyes: “What
is more, with the natural decay of the body, its consistuent ingredients become so much part of the fabric of
the natural world that it would be impossible to reconstitute the body of one individual without violating
the integrity of other bodies. This is because my body is made up of molecules that, in the long expanse of
biological time, have belonged to other bodies, and are likely yet to be constitutive of more bodies in the
future. If the resurrection requires the reassembly of our bodies at the end of the age, how will God
adjudicate the inevitably competing claims to these elements?” (Green 2008, 178)
12

Bynum notes John XXII’s opinion that souls “linger in the air” until final judgement. (Bynum 1995,
282)
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(Douie n.d.) However, his views were later dismissed by Pope Benedict XII in the
encyclical, Benedictus Deus:
…all these souls, immediately (mox) after death and, in the case of those
in need of purification, after the purification mentioned above, since the
ascension of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ into heaven, already before
they take up their bodies again and before the general judgment, have
been, are and will be with Christ in heaven, in the heavenly kingdom and
paradise, joined to the company of the holy angels. (Benedict XII 1336)
As we continue to live and work in a pluralistic and secular society, it seems that
questions regarding the human soul and its relationship to the human body will only
become more prevalent. As the neurological sciences progress, it will be the
responsibility of the theologian to be in communication with, and to interpret these
developments in light of sacred scripture and historical belief. However, we must first
come to terms with many of our beliefs and assumptions regarding the soul and the body.
A better understanding of Aquinas’ views helps to explain many of the underlying
(though perhaps unfounded) beliefs of our society. By taking Aquinas’ work into
account, the theologian might gain a better understanding of our present, and be better
equipped to look towards our future.
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2.2 Bynum and the Problem of Thomistic Dualism
An interesting critique of Thomistic dualism is found in Carolyn Walker Bynum’s book,
The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity. In it, Bynum points out
contradictions in Aquinas’ model that are problematic not only for our modern day
purposes, but may have been so for those living around the turn of the 13th century.
Bynum’s writes, “The nature of the body-soul, matter-form nexus had obvious
implications for transubstantiation, the transmission of original sin, the growth of the
fetus in the womb, the processes of nutrition and decay…” She continues, “theologians of
the 1280s did not fail to explore these questions at new and great length” (Bynum 1995,
272). As novel as the developments in the neurological sciences and their implications for
the Christian faith might seem, in many ways, the questions we ask reflect questions
asked throughout Christian history. This chapter will look specifically at the conflict
between unicity and plurality in the decades that surrounded the year 1300, as described
by Carolyn Walker Bynum. It will compare the Thomistic understanding of the soul to
those that challenged it, specifically in light of the resurrection as described by the
apostle Paul.
Bynum points to Aquinas’ work on 1 Corinthians 15 to begin her exposition: work
composed before his death, but completed by a close disciple (Bynum 1995, 232). He
rejected the seed image in vv. 36-38 and 42-44, specifically because Paul’s imagery
suggests a distinction between the sheaf and the seed. The passage seemes to imply that
the reborn seed is fundamentally different than the organism from which it came. For

38

Thomas, it was necessary that resurrection imagery support a new creation identical to
the original creation (Bynum 1995, 234). Bynum summarizes Thomas’ conflict this way:
Resurrection is not a natural process. There is no force (no “seminal
reason” or “virtue”) in things that directs them toward return. Body
dissolves into a dust that has no more power or fertility than any other
dust. Resurrection is exactly the opposite of germination. Grain returns as
an adult sheaf similar to the sheaf that bore the dissimilar seed; it returns
by natural (internal and organic) process as a like but numerically
nonidentical instance. Body returns not naturally but by divine power...
(Bynum 1995, 235)
Aquinas viewed the soul and body as being distinct, but intricately linked. The [human]
soul, as he viewed it, eternal and nonphysical, was the first principle of life, necessary to
animate the body. He allowed for the possibility that the soul, being self-subsistent, could
exist without the body, however as an incomplete human (Bynum 1995, 236, 257).13
Even still, Thomas (and others of his day) never suggested that a person was “a soul
using a body”, or as described in our time, “a ghost in the machine” (Bynum 1995, 256).
The human person existed only as the sum of its parts. Herein lies the dilemma: because
the Thomistic human was interpreted as the holistic combination of body and soul; and
because physical death was without question, the Thomistic soul required a continued
existence until the resurrection, at which point the body (and in Thomas’ case, the same

13

See also S.T., 1, q.75, art. 4.
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body) would be reunited to the soul. In a way, it seems that Aquinas came very close to
“a soul using a body,” albeit indirectly: by moving towards a theory of formal identity,
where the soul contained the human person’s form (that which informed matter), the
body’s value comes into question: without the soul, the body is nothing. As Aquinas
wrote, “It is more correct to say that soul contains body... and makes it to be one, than the
converse” (Bynum 1995, 259).14, 15 Bynum elaborates:
Thomas argues that the soul without a body is a fragment. “When
separated from the body, [it] is, in a way, imperfect, even as any part is
when severed from the whole; [for] the soul is naturally part of human
nature.” “Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but
that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand or a foot
cannot be called a hypostasis or a person; nor likewise is the soul so
called, since it is part of the species human being.” (ST Ia, q.75, art. 4)
Thus the soul is a fragment, mute and limited; without body, it is blocked
up. The blueprint of all we are—our shape and size, our gender and
intellectual capacity, our status and merit—may be carried in soul, but it is
realized in the body. Without bodily expression, there is no human being
(homo), no person, no self. Aquinas can be read both as eclipsing and
guaranteeing the ontological significance of the body. (Bynum 1995, 269)

14
15

ST Ia, q.76, art. 3 (translation Bynum)

It seems the quote mistakenly attributed to C.S. Lewis, as noted in chapter 1.3, might be more accurately
credited to Aquinas.
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Bynum is not alone in her interpretation of the Summa. Robert Pasnau summarizes,
The soul is responsible for all of what makes me be me, in the sense that
my defining attributes, physical and mental, 'flow from' the soul. (Pasnau
2002, 389)
Likewise, in Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul,
Eleonore Stump looks to the soul’s necessity in the resurrection of the body:
…on Aquinas's account, the soul is what makes unformed prime matter
into this human being by configuring prime matter in such a way that
matter is this living animal capable of intellectual cognition. In the
resurrection of the body, by informing unformed matter, the soul makes
unformed matter this human being again, (Stump 2006, 170)
Thomas was not alone in these views. In fact, “the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215
required Cathars and other heretics to assent to the proposition that ‘all rise with their
own individual bodies, that is, the bodies which they now wear,' and the Second Council
of Lyon in 1274 reaffirmed the requirement” (Bynum 1995, 272). But this unicity of form
was not without its critics. Henry of Ghent rejected it because he believed it suggested
that a relic was not really the saint (Bynum 1995, 275). In Thomas’ day, such a
theological statement had wide-ranging effects. Accordingly, he and his contemporaries
dedicated much energy to matters of the broken body: cannibalism, injury, and relic. The
solution, for Aquinas, seems to rest in God’s ability to ‘reassemble’ the body (Bynum
1995, 263).
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Bynum notes that Thomas “does not specifically ask what the resurrection body adds to
the soul,” concluding,
the fundamental contradiction in Aquinas’ thought thus rests in exactly the
place where philosophers have seen his greatest creativity... it is not finally
clear whether Thomas places primary emphasis on soul as substantial
form, united with God in beatific vision and spilling forth its glory in an
expression of self we call body, or whether he gives first importance to the
substance homo, whose components are each incomplete without the
other. (Bynum 1995, 268)
In Thomas’ case, it seems that the resurrection of the body must be considered only
because the soul must have a vessel to animate. Still, today’s reader may question the
very necessity of the soul. Swinburne clarifies:
Aquinas claimed that the soul does not need any bodily organ for thinking,
and that is a main reason why he supposes that the whole soul can
continue to exist without a body. (Swinburne 1998)
In that sense, the notion that the holistic human is made of both body and soul seems to
be defeated. Aquinas’ ideas were condemned in both 1277 and 1286 (Bynum 1995, 274275). While Thomas’ contradictions might seem obvious to the modern reader, they
describe a theology that attempts to make sense of a tradition steeped in piety, which
understood human biology very differently than we do today.
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Following Bynam’s examination of Thomas’ body-soul, matter-form nexus, it seems
appropriate to look to a contemporary theologian for comparison. Again, we look to Ted
Peters, and his attempt to reinterpret human ontology and the resurrection in light of
modern scientific research. In doing so, Peters looks to 1 Corinthians 15, just as Aquinas
did.
But Peters is compelled to respond to the issues of our day: namely, to scientific research
and the materialism that follows it. He reads the Pauline seed imagery with cultural
context in mind: a tool not accessible to Aquinas. And Peters, reading Paul through the
lenses of both modern science and historical criticism, writes, “there is no abiding life
force at all that perdures through death.” (T. Peters 2003, 306)
Here, we revisit Peters’ reading of the Pauline epistle: he describes a world where the
human person was seen as a united whole: body and soul united in form and substance.
Peters calls us to verse 36: “what you sow does not come to life unless it dies” (1 Cor.
15:36), explaining that “resurrection is not exactly creation out of nothing, but creation of
something out of something else. A dead seed is sown, but what is harvested is new life”
(T. Peters 2003, 307). Like Aquinas, Peters identifies a difference between the seed and
the sheaf, but without the necessity of a continuing soul or a reunited body, he (perhaps
like St. Peter) is able to see the resurrection as a more miraculous event. For Peters,
sharing in Christ’s resurrection was miraculous not because the believers’ eternal souls
would be reunited with their bodies, but because they who were fully dead would
experience new birth!
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Truly, Carolyn Walker Bynum’s words, “the nature of the body-soul, matter-form nexus
had obvious implications for transubstantiation, the transmission of original sin, the
growth of the fetus in the womb, the processes of nutrition and decay” could be used to
describe a modern theological problem. But the problem of body-soul dualism is one the
Church has long struggled with, as we see in Aquinas’ interpretation of 1 Cor 13. Bynum
correctly points out the contradiction in his attempts to unite the body and soul. By
looking to contemporary theologians like Ted Peters, we see that by looking through a
materialist lens, we are better able to see the human person a holistic being: an
interpretation that might not only bring us closer to the implications of the text, but
provide the hope of new birth in a renewed understanding of the resurrection.

2.3 The New Testament and the Search for Understanding
In the first chapter, I drew attention to a survey Nancey Murphy frequently offers during
speaking engagements. The quiz asks, “which of the following comes closest to your
understanding of human nature?” Murphy comments on one of the possible answers:
“Who cares?” is included as a teaser, since I shall argue that it actually
represents the biblical view. (Murphy 2006, 3)
Following our analysis of Aquinas’ proposal, and before we look to the Hebrew
scriptures, it seems appropriate to consider Murphy’s reading of what the New Testament
offers—perspectives that might not only explain the paradox we find in Aquinas, but that
provide a rationale for looking to the Hebrew tradition for clarity. Murphy explains the
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teaser offered in her survey with a simple statement: “the Bible has no clear teaching
here” (Murphy 2006, 4).
She makes this bold statement in light of changing views on the New Testament’s
offerings over time: while Kant and theologians of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries promoted body-soul dualism as an enlightened Christian view, others, like H.
Wheeler Robinson, looked beyond the New Testament to the Hebrew texts:
Robinson argued that the Hebrew idea of personality is that of an animated
body, not (like the Greek) that of an incarnated soul. (Murphy 2006, 8)
Why? Because the New Testament, it seems, provides multiple and occasionally
conflicting perspectives. For instance, while this paper makes reference to Pauline texts
that note the finality of death and the hope of resurrection, it is true that other Pauline
texts seem to support a dualistic model. Murphy references a few:
(1) Matthew 10:28 (REB), “Do not fear those who kill the body, but
cannot kill the soul. Fear him rather who is able to destroy both soul and
body in hell;” (2) Luke 16:19-31, the story of Lazarus in which (without
reference to prior resurrection of the body) Lazarus is said to be with
Abraham; (3) Luke 23:39-43, in which Jesus says to one of those crucified
with him that he will be with him today in Paradise; and (4) 2 Corinthians
5:1-10, in which Paul says that “in this present body we groan, yearning to
be covered by our heavenly habitation put over this one, in the hope that,
being thus clothed, we shall not find ourselves naked.”
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Murphy admits that “it is not clear what to make of these passages” (Murphy 2006, 19).
But she goes on to say that given the diversity of views present in the Early Church’s
communities, our confusion may be due to our looking for answers that simply aren’t
there:
The unlikelihood of a positive answer to my rhetorical question leads me
to this conclusion: the New Testament authors are not intending to teach
anything about humans’ meta-physical composition. If they were, surely
they could have done so much more clearly! (Murphy 2006, 21)
In this case, James Dunn provides a distinction between the Hebraic understanding and
the Greek understanding that influenced the Early Church:
…in simplified terms, while Greek thought tended to regard the human
being as made up of distinct parts, Hebraic thought saw the human being
more as a whole person existing as on different dimensions. As we might
say, it was more characteristically Greek to conceive of the human person
“partitively,” whereas it was more characteristically Hebrew to conceive
of the human person “aspectively.” That is to say, we speak of a school
having a gym (the gym is part of the school); but we say I am a Scot (my
Scottishness is an aspect of my whole being). (Dunn 1998, 54)
For our purposes, Dunn’s definitions are particularly helpful, as they clarify that the
seemingly conflicting views present in the New Testament, and particularly in Paul’s
letters, probably say more about what we read into them than about they intend to imply.
As Murphy concludes, “Paul’s distinction between spirit and flesh is not our later
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distinction between soul and body. Paul is concerned with two ways of living: one of
conformity with the Spirit of God, and the other with the old aeon before Christ”
(Murphy 2006, 22). Given the complexity (and the possible irrelevance) of these texts in
our goal of interdisciplinary dialogue, we will look further back, to the inherited Hebrew
texts and tradition.

2.4 Resurrection, Death, and Life in the Hebrew Scriptures
It is not uncommon to think about the resurrection of the body as a Christian concept.
After all, resurrection central in both the Easter story and in apocalyptic literature. It
could be said that without the resurrection, there could be no Christianity. Furthermore,
Jesus’ resurrection and the promise of humanity’s share in the same is often interpreted as
Christianity’s addition to Judaism: that which sets it apart.
However, a theology of the resurrection has long been an important element of the Jewish
faith. In Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God of
Life, Jon Levenson recognizes this fact, observing a gradual development of resurrection
theology throughout history. He describes the resurrection of the dead as “a weightbearing beam” in Judaism:
…the rabbis’ vision of redemption and their understanding of Jewish
peoplehood. Without the restoration of the people Israel, a flesh-and-blood
people, God’s promises to them remain unfulfilled, and the world
remained unredeemed. (Levenson 2006, ix)
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Levenson asserts that the common view that Judaism is lacking resurrection theology is a
recent phenomenon—a product of the rationalistic and scientific thinking of the past 350
years (Levenson 2006, 23). He observes the modern suspicion of the Mishnah, the first of
the Rabbinic texts, suggesting that a misreading leads to an unnecessary dismissal of the
resurrection: "as they [modernists] read the Bible... the religion of even the great
prophets... was without suspicion of either Resurrection or Immortality as these came to
be understood" (Levenson 2006, 24). Levenson observes that modern readers, looking to
Isaiah 60:21 as a proof text, read a future that is both universally inclusive, and without
resurrection, into the text. But here, he calls the reader back to the Mishnah as evidence
that the tradition did, in fact, refer to an exclusive resurrection of the dead:
And why so much? A Tanna taught: he denied the resurrection of the
dead. Therefore he shall have no share in the resurrection of the
dead. For all the measures [of retribution] of the Holy One (blessed be
He!) operate on the principle that the consequence fits the deed.
(b. Sanh. 90a) (Levenson, 25)
Levenson suggests that this text was likely aimed at the Sadducees, quoting Acts 23:8:
“the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, or angel, or spirit; but the Pharisees
acknowledge all three” (Levenson 2006, 25). The Mishnah, he says, is both exclusive in
the sense that it requires Jews to believe that the Torah itself proclaims resurrection, and
inclusive in the sense that it included all Jews who held allegiance to the Torah (and
therefore all Jews) (Levenson 2006, 26). In this way, he not only provides evidence that
the resurrection was included in the Mishnah, but that the Mishnah's rabbinic authors
believed that the Torah itself affirmed the resurrection of the body.
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Levenson also looks to the Talmud to make his case, as it comments on Num 18:28, "and
from them you shall bring the gift for the LORD to Aaron the priest":
Did Aaron exist forever? Was it not the case that he never entered the
Land of Israel; and yet the gift should be rendered to him? Rather, it
teaches that he will be resurrected and Israel will give him the gift. Hence,
resurrection of the dead can be derived from the Torah (b. Sanh. 90b)
(Levenson 2006, 28).
That being said, Levenson does not go so far as to suggest that the Torah itself contains
the concept of resurrection in any blatant or literal form: rather, he concludes that there
was considerable distance between the scriptural sources and the rabbinic interpretation.
He writes, “their exegeses mediate the difference by assimilating the Pentateuch to the
pattern of religion of the rabbinic expositors themselves. They are, in a word, derash, the
product of midrashic interpretation and not historico-grammatical exegesis” (Levenson
2006, 28).
Levenson suggests that a modern interpretation of the rabbis' exegeses might compare it
to that of the early Christians. Both, in this case, read their own eschatological beliefs into
scripture. However, despite each community’s tendency to read its own beliefs into the
text, both recognized one common theme in the scriptures: the irreversibility of death.
Acknowledging death’s permanence, Levenson quotes 2 Sam 14:14: "We must all die;
we are like water that is poured out on the ground and cannot be gathered up” (Levenson
2006, 167). It is a reading that, for some, may provide relief: life concludes with a natural
and holy end. It is interesting to note that as Levenson describes this interpretation, he
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places the modern reader in much the same exegetical place he does the historic rabbis—
one of interpretation based on belief and context rather than historico-grammatical
exegesis. The problem, he suggests, is that this kind of reading neglects the familial and
social aspects of Jewish life. Quoting Robert Di Vito, “ancient Israel is an ‘aggregate of
groups rather than a collection of individuals, and, apart from the family, the individual is
scarcely a viable entity--socially, economically, or juridically’” (Levenson 2006, 167).
Levenson draws our attention to a theological tension that exists between the certainty of
death and the promise of life. He asks, “how can the same God who creates human beings
mortal and decrees their death also promise them life as a consequence of obedience to
his commands, or even as a gracious gift made despite their failure to obey” (Levenson
2006, 169)? He answers by clarifying the meaning of the word life. While the phrase, "to
bring to life" might suggest healing or even resurrection to the modern mind, says
Levenson, it is likely that the ancient Israelite would have understood it to mean health
and happiness rather than deathlessness (Levenson 2006, 169). The opposite of life, then,
is “weakness, disease, depression, and the like, but also a humiliating death, especially
one that is violent or premature” (Levenson 2006, 170).
As Levenson revisits the question of whether resurrection of the body is present in the
Hebrew Bible, his answer is twofold. No, he says, resurrection is not present in the
ancient texts, save for Elijah and Enoch. Death is "universal and inevitable." And yet, he
is quick to lean on the ancient understanding of life:
But I have been at pains to argue that the irreversibility and inevitability
of death in the Hebrew Bible is only part of the story. The other part is
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the ubiquitous promise of life, sometimes conditional, sometimes not,
offered by a God who enjoins his people, in the words of Deut 30:19,
to “choose life.” (Levenson 2006, 180)
The only direct reference to general resurrection that exists in the Hebrew Bible,
Levenson concludes, is that found in Dan 12:1-3. Daniel's eschatological vision stands
alone in the Jewish texts, as one developed from a long tradition that began with the
Torah, though Levenson is quick to note Canaanite and Zoroastrian influences
(Levenson, 214-15). The common thread throughout is the tension between the certainty
of death and the promise of life.
But what of the divide between modern belief and that of the rabbinic tradition?
Levenson chides,
By revising the Jewish tradition in the direction Silver takes, one can
claim to be a good Jew while at the same time adhering to a modern
materialist sense of human existence and destiny of the sort that dismisses
resurrection as an embarrassing relic of the childhood of humanity, a
groundless fantasy. Christianity, by way of contrast, founded on the
proclamation of Jesus’ Resurrection, thus appears not only as incompatible
with modern thought but as a deviation from the teaching of Scriptures
that Jews and Christians hold in common to boot. (Levenson 2006, 2)
And sarcastically,
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The Christians, vulnerable to a crude superstition about a god-man who
came back from the dead, have perverted the Hebrew Bible by introducing
something altogether foreign into it. In contrast, the Jews, by adhering to
their Bible’s belief in the naturalness of death, are the true and exclusive
heirs to the Scriptures and, what is more, exemplars of a position
altogether in line with modern scientific thinking.” (Levenson 2006, 6)
Levenson’s reading of the Jewish tradition is important in our task. While he denies the
existence of the resurrection in the Hebrew Scriptures, suggesting that the tradition’s
theology was read into the text, he clarifies that the certainty of death that was present
throughout—the same certainty that would have informed the world into which Jesus
proclaimed the good news, and the same certainty that would have informed the Jewish
Apostles. Meanwhile, he presents a hopeful relationship between death and life—one into
which we may willingly find ourselves guilty of reading our own experience, as we look
for new ways to understand the general resurrection without relying on the trap of
dualism. Perhaps Levenson summarizes it best: "In the case of the resurrection, the last
word lies once again not with death—undeniably grievous though it is, but with life”
(Levenson 2006, 216).
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Chapter 3

3

Interdisciplinary Dialogue

If theologians wish to prevent cultural stalemate by avoiding the uneasy truce identified
in the preceding chapters, then what is the way forward? This chapter will suggest
interdisciplinary dialogue: first, by exploring Robert Delfino’s paper, “Science and the
Inescapability of Metaphysics,” it will consider the limits of scientific research,
concluding that all disciplines, including the natural sciences, rely on metaphysics and
speculation to make conclusions beyond those easily observable. It will then explore
those limits, and the perceived need for dialogue between the two disciplines as presented
by Wentzel van Huyssteen. Finally, it will look to van Huyssteen’s postfoundational
model for a solution.

3.1 Science and Theology Need One Another
In an earlier chapter, I explored the problem of dualism fostered in recent centuries by
attempts to allow science and theology to coexist, albeit independently. It seems that this
dualism has not developed over the years in the process of dialogue, but rather has been
present from the moment science and theology were first identified as asking different
questions, or as operating in different realms. In this chapter, I will continue the dialogue
between religion and science. However, noting the problem of dualism, I will consider a
different approach. Rather than suggesting that science and theology both ask and answer
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different questions, or that the two operate in different realms, I will allow the two to
overlap. Using examples in the area of creation and cosmology, I will consider the
advantages of allowing both disciplines to ask the same questions, and suggest that
further dialogue between scientists and theologians may lead to an objectivity that is
advantageous, though not without problems.
In his paper, “Science and the Inescapability of Metaphysics,” Robert Delfino rightly
identifies scientism as a barrier to dialogue between science and metaphysics (Delfino
2010). If one begins this conversation with the assumption that knowledge can be
achieved only through science, all other means will, by definition, either be nullified, or
will need to be explained under the blanket of science.16 However, Delfino argues that
science does not function independently of non-scientific disciplines, but relies instead on
a foundation of metaphysics. Calling on Garcia's Metaphysics and its Task:
Metaphysics, then, turns out to be the categorical foundation of
knowledge... All our knowledge depends on metaphysical views whether
we are aware of it or not, and all our thinking involves metaphysical
thinking... Metaphysics is inescapable. (Garcia 1999, 220-221)
Delfino's argument is strongest in his reference to terms adopted by Stenmark: first,
epistemic scientism, which limits human knowledge to only that which science has access
to, and second, ontological scientism, which limits reality itself to only that which science

16
Delfino suggests that these other disciplines must undergo significant changes for absorption into
science. One must question the integrity of the product that follows such changes, as both true science or as
its original discipline.
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has access to (Stenmark 2001, 8). He claims that both these approaches are problematic:
epistemic scientism, because it limits human knowledge to only one discipline, and
ontological scientism, because it claims that science offers a complete understanding of
all that exists. The latter method's failures are obvious: if reality consists of only that
which science has access to, the purpose of further scientific exploration must be called
into question. If that which is outside of [current] scientific knowledge does not exist,
research is no longer necessary, and the scientific discipline itself is without purpose.
However, problems with epistemic scientism are not as clear. For those who support it,
limiting human knowledge to only that obtained through science would not seem to be
problematic.
Here lies the core of Delfino's proposal: citing two of Stenmark's observations, he argues
that epistemic scientism cannot stand on its own, and that science itself cannot escape
metaphysics:
First, he argues that epistemic scientism is self-refuting. This is because,
once again, we cannot use scientific experimentation to know that “the
only reality that we can know anything about is the one science has access
to”... Second, Stenmark notes that if we are able to know some things
independently of science then epistemic scientism is falsified... memory,
observational knowledge, introspective knowledge, linguistic knowledge,
and intentional knowledge. (Delfino 2010)
This comes as no surprise. The notion that any one path to knowledge can be interpreted
without objectivity leads to problems for both the scientist and the theologian. Known
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theist, Richard Swinburne, deals with this very matter in his book, The Existence of God.
In regards to his cosmological argument for the existence of God, he states plainly,
...in the absence of any worthwhile argument to the contrary
known to me, I shall assume that the non-existence of God is
logically compatible with the existence of the universe, and so that
the cosmological argument is not a valid, and so not a good,
deductive argument. (Swinburne 2004, 268)
Such a conclusion would be easily reconciled with the atheist views of Quentin Smith,
who quotes Swinburne's acknowledgement of deductive logic's inability to prove the
presence of God in creation, and specifically, in the Big Bang (Smith 1998). But
Swinburne recognizes that science, by itself, cannot provide an exhaustive explanation of
the universe, and so he goes on to provide a long (and somewhat circular) argument that
allows for inductive reasoning to support the existence of God. In the process, he
provides a fascinating comparison between the 'gaps' of religious belief, and the 'gaps' of
science:
[Hume and Kant] produce principles designed to show that reason could
never reach justified conclusions about matters much beyond the range of
immediate experience, and above all that reason could never reach a
justified conclusion about the existence of God... Hume and Kant are
mistaken and... reason can reach justified conclusions outside the narrow
boundaries drawn by those philosophers. Those who believe in the ability
of modern science to reach justified (and exciting) conclusions about
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things far beyond immediate experience, such as subatomic particles and
nuclear forces, the 'Big Bang' and cosmic evolution, ought to be highly
sympathetic to my enterprise. (Delfino 2010)
Indeed, modern science, and especially modern physics, requires the reader, researcher,
and believer to look far beyond immediate experience. In matters such as the relationship
between time and space, the structure of the universe(s), and what occurs at the time of
death, one must call upon inductive reasoning to make any conclusions.
Yet Quentin Smith seems unable to see, or at least to acknowledge, the gaps in his own
beliefs. In his paper, “Atheism, Theism and Big Bang Cosmology,” Smith defends a
nontheistic interpretation of the Big Bang Theory, noting that while a theistic
interpretation “has received both popular endorsement and serious philosophical
defense... the nontheistic interpretation remains largely underdeveloped and
unpromulgated” (Smith 1991, I). Smith concludes, most notably, that the universe exists
“without cause”. However, in his attempt to prove this claim, Smith makes certain
theological assumptions that seem questionable. For instance, as he makes his atheistic
argument, he makes the claim (calling it a theological premise) that “an animate universe
is better than an inanimate universe.” Such a claim seems beyond what could be observed
by either science or by theology. Science would never claim to know the mind of God,
and while one might acknowledge that in the Genesis narrative, God calls creation “very
good,” it seems presumptuous to suggest that God would prefer an animate creation over
any other kind. Smith defends this claim, and others, by resting on the God of popChristianity: “the idea that God has no more reason to create an animate universe than an
inanimate one is inconsistent with the kind of person we normally conceive God to be.”
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One might wonder exactly what Smith means when he, as an atheist, refers to “the kind
of person we normally conceive God to be”. The assumption in question seems to rely on
a particularly conservative theology and/or a literal interpretation of scripture. It seems
fair to assume that most modern theologians and biblical scholars are able to view the
scriptural accounts of creation as attempts by historical cultures to make sense of their
place on the earth and their relationship with God. It seems to follow that if the universe
(or another universe) existed in a different state of animation, different creatures might
have documented different accounts of creation. Regarding Smith's preference for an
animate creation, even a conservative/literal reading of scripture points to a God who
lives in relation with the inanimate (or those things thought to be inanimate):
Some of the Pharisees in the crowd said to him, “Teacher, order your
disciples to stop.” He answered, “I tell you, if these were silent, the stones
would shout out.” (Lk 19:30-40)
For the creation waits with eager longing... the creation was subjected to
futility... the creation itself will be set free from bondage... the whole
creation has been groaning... (Ro 8:19-22).
It seems that causality is at the crux of Smith's argument. Given Quantum physics'
rejection of the principle that all explanations must be deterministic (Delfino 2010),
Smith's theory is based on the notion that the infinite universe must exist without reason
or cause:
There are numerous possible universes, and there is possibly no universe
at all, and there is no reason why this one is actual rather than some other
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one or none at all. Now the theistically inclined person might think this
grounds for despair, in that the alleged human need for a reason for
existence, and other alleged needs, are unsatisfied. But I suggest that
humans do or can possess a deeper level of experience than such
anthropocentric despairs. We can forget about ourselves for a moment and
open ourselves up to the startling impingement of reality itself. We can let
ourselves become profoundly astonished by the fact that this universe
exists at all. (Smith 1991, VIII)
Yet as William Craig suggests, Smith's reasoning is “infected with positivism,” leading to
the assumption that there is a connection between predictability and causation (Craig
1993). While the breadth of his criticism is beyond the scope of this paper, one of Craig's
conclusions serves our purposes well:
Smith has failed to show that [the theistic hypothesis] is unreasonable.
Moreover, for the theist, it is not the case that all things are equal in this
matter, for he has independent reasons (from philosophy and revelation)
for accepting creatio ex nihilo apart from the scientific evidence (Craig
1993). 17

17

It should be noted that creatio ex nihilo, the only theological option Smith considers, is only one of a
few possible theological concepts, such as creation ex materia, or creation ex deo. the latter of which is
preferred by Levenson as the intended meaning of the Hebrew texts: “The traditional Jewish and Christian
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo can be found only in this chapter if one translates its first verse as “In the
beginning God created the heavens and the earth” and understands it to refer to some comprehensive
creative act on the first day. But… it is true-and quite significant-that the God of Israel has no myth of
origin.” (Levenson 1988, 5)
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As Delfino suggested, interdisciplinary work can be helpful: in this case, the theologian
can make good use of scientific research to understand cosmology/creation more fully18.
The question, then, is this: if it is true that theologians can look to science to fill gaps
their discipline cannot, can scientists look to theology? The answer, at least in the scope
of this paper, seems to be that they can, but not that they must. The obvious risk of a
narrow view is scientism. As noted by Swinburne, the nontheistic cosmological argument
is plausible, despite its gaps. The theistic argument, on the other hand, cannot be seen as a
plausible model by means of deductive logic, though it can be by means of induction.
However, as Willem Drees observes, it does provide answers that science alone cannot:
Even if complex phenomena within reality are understood naturalistically,
the world as such is not thereby explained. Hence, there remains room for
a sense of wonder and gratitude. The world may still be seen as dependent
upon some source which transcends the world. (Drees 1995, 236-237)
There are implied risks to this proposed relationship: statements like Drees' could easily
lead us to fall back on the “God of the gaps”—that is, convenient supernatural
explanations for any questions which science has not yet answered. History shows us that
such beliefs may lead not only to a lack of progress and development, but to serious
religious crises as science does make progress (one of which this paper seeks to address).

18

On a related note, in an interview with CBC TV's George Strombopolous, noted atheist Richard
Dawkins said of his book, The Greatest Show on Earth: The Evidence for Evolution, “there is nothing in it
that should bother a clergyman, who is a well educated clergyman, who accepts, necessarily, the evidence
for evolution.” http://www.cbc.ca/thehour/video.html?id=1436229362
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I would argue that Delfino's interdisciplinary model is useful in the conversation between
theology and science. However, I make that claim as a theologian, well aware that many
scientists would disagree. While Delfino is correct in that science cannot escape
metaphysics, it seems that it can escape theology, or in the case of the cosmological
argument, theism. However, one who falls into scientism must be satisfied with
unanswered questions of purpose, as Smith claims to be:
It is arguably a truth of the 'metaphysics of feeling' that this fact is indeed
'stupefying' and is most fully appreciated in such experiences as the one
evoked in the following passage: '[This world] exists nonnecessarily,
improbably, and causelessly. It exists for absolutely no reason at all. It is
inexplicably and stunningly actual... The impact of this captivated
realization upon me is overwhelming. I am completely stunned. I take a
few dazed steps in the dark meadow, and fall among the flowers. I lie
stupefied, whirling without comprehension in this world through
numberless worlds other than this one. (Smith 1991, VII)

3.2 Method for Dialogue
Today’s theologian is faced with a difficult challenge. In an ever-changing secular and
pluralistic society, the voice of the theologian often goes unheard. Furthermore, tensions
within the Church often result in theological discussions that remain internal. When those
engaged in theological reflection fall into, or become victims of privatism, they fail to
engage with the world around them. They are quite literally ‘preaching to the choir.’
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What, then, is the alternative? How might theology continue to support its claims of
relevance and truth? David Tracy’s proposal is this:
Theology, by the very nature of the very kind of existential questions it
asks and because of the nature of the reality of God upon which theology
reflects, must develop public, not private criteria and discourse. Yet the
publicness which theology achieves must also speak from and to three
publics: society, academy, and church. (Tracy 1981, ix)
The development of Tracy’s approach, some thirty years ago, and its application in our
time should come as no surprise. After all, Lambeth 1968 supported what has become
known as the three-legged stool (The Lambeth Conference 1968), a theological reasoning
more open to public discourse than originally proposed by Richard Hooker (Hooker
1876, 8:2). In many ways, public theology has now become the norm, as theologians seek
to engage the public spheres in their work.19
However, with few exceptions, many theologians of our day have failed to participate in
continuing discourse with the scientific community. While acknowledging the wisdom of
a theology that engages and is engaged by the public at all levels, this chapter will
identify theology’s general reluctance and inability to allow science to be part of this
ongoing dialogue (and vice-versa). It will look specifically to the work of J. Wentzel van
Huyssteen for a model which suggests not only discourse, but interdisciplinary work.

19

See, for example, The Primate’s Theological Commission, “The Galilee Report,” The Anglican
Church of Canada, http://www.anglican.ca/primate/ptc/galilee/1-report.htm;
http://www.anglican.ca/primate/ptc/galilee/toc.htm.
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Finally, it will look to Van Huyssteen’s most recent book, Alone in the World? Human
Uniqueness in Science and Theology, and specifically to his reinterpretation of the imago
Dei, as an application of this proposed interdisciplinary theology.
In regards to recent developments in the world of science, many Christians have reacted
in one of two ways: either resorting to fundamentalism, and necessarily denying the
rational and logical observations that science provides, or avoiding engagement
altogether, settling on an uneasy truce.20 Both reactions serve only to fuel what Taylor
calls disenchantment, allowing our society to “slough off the transcendent.” (Taylor
2007, loc. 8614)
Often times, an uneasy truce is rationalized by making certain assumptions: a scientific
explanation of the natural order is valid. The religious account of creation is valid.
However, both are exclusive and independent. Each approach provides different answers
because each approach asks different questions.
To support these assumptions, science and theology are sometimes portrayed as operating
within two separate planes or realms of existence: theology in the spiritual realm, and
science in the physical realm. If we are to accept the existence of both a physical realm
and a spiritual realm, our understanding of realms might provide the necessary
framework for two conflicting realities to coexist.

20

Note the striking example of this uneasy truce given in chapter 1: namely, the account of the
San Fransisco Public School Board’s 1972 decision to ban all discussion regarding the source of
life.
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The simple truth is that quite often, science and theology ask the same questions. And
many times, they provide different answers. While the theologian may choose to ignore
or avoid this reality, scientific development provides not only a unique way for
theologians to maintain relevant dialogue with the academy and with society, but to
accept and interpret new revelation.
What Van Huyssteen suggests is interdisciplinary dialogue. This uncomfortable proposal
is, perhaps, more in line with the aforementioned model of theology within the public
sphere than we have been willing to admit. As Van Huyssteen reminds us, “while the
rationality of theological reflection is shaped by its concrete embeddedness in specific
traditions, it also is definitively shaped by its location in the living context of
interdisciplinary reflection” (van Huyssteen 1998a, 4). What that implies, for theologians,
is that in fields outside of our expertise, we must be willing to let someone else do the
work. And though many are willing to look to news media or to film and other forms of
popular culture as they interact with public theology, Christian theologians generally
continue to keep science at an arm’s length. However, few outside fundamentalist
traditions would claim to understand or explain how the physical world around us came
to be, or by what means our physical bodies are capable of interacting with the Spirit.21
Van Huyssteen asks only that we remain aware of the boundaries of our own discipline
(van Huyssteen 1998a, 45). Likewise, he calls on scientists to do the same,

21

For our purposes, the Holy other: God.
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acknowledging that while the natural sciences often provide us with answers to the hows,
they find their own limitations with questions such as these:
Why does our universe exist?
Where do the universal laws of physics come from?
What is the status of these laws of nature, and are these particular laws so
absolute that no alternative laws could be imagined?
Why can we describe complex physical processes by using simple
mathematical formulae? (van Huyssteen 1998a, 66)
These questions, he observes, are of crucial importance to science, but cannot be
answered without interdisciplinary dialogue. Postfoundationalism’s demands remind us
of Hans Küng’s similar conclusion:
Science has rightly become the foundation for modern technology and
industry, indeed, for the modern picture of the world, modern civilization
and culture. But science will meaningfully do justice to this role only if the
foundation is not made the whole building; if people see the relativity and
provisionality, the social conditioning and ethical implications of every
picture of the world, of all sketches, models, and aspects; if alongside
scientific methods those of the humanities and social sciences are also
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allowed, and with them those of philosophy and—in yet another way—
theology. 22 (Küng 2007, loc 510)

As an illustration of the stalemate disciplinary independence can cause, Van Huyssteen
draws us to the field of cosmology: one which raises questions of particular importance to
both the scientist and the theologian. Likewise, it is a field of science which often steps
into the metaphysical, the speculative, and even faith. And rightly so: it is a field which
explores things unseen, and time unknown. Science itself, as observed by many, requires
a willingness to vision beyond empirical data. Metaphysics is inescapable.
Because the boundaries between science and theology are constantly shifting, Van
Huyssteen suggests that in this case, rather than identifying the shifts in science and
theology as a duel, the metaphor of a duet may be more productive for all those involved
(van Huyssteen 1998a, 40). He leans on the work of astrophysicist and theologian
William Stoeger, advising that rather than viewing science and theology as disciplines
which “focus on different objects (for instance, a focus on empirical problems vs. divine
mystery), what we should emphasize, rather, is precisely their important differences in
focus, experiential ground, and heuristic structures” (van Huyssteen 1998a, 54).
As perhaps one the most conspicuous examples of interdisciplinary stalemate in the field
of cosmology, Van Huyssteen calls on the work of Stephen Hawking: specifically, his
book, A Brief History of Time. He draws our attention to the fact that Hawking recognizes
the fact that the Big Bang Theory implies that there is an absolute beginning, opening the

22

Küng makes the same demand of theologians.
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possibility for the Bang itself to have a cause, and for some, implying the possibility of
the existence of God (van Huyssteen 1998a, 58).
When most people believed in an essentially static and unchanging
universe, the question of whether or not it had a beginning was really one
of metaphysics or theology. (Hawking 1998, 6)
Van Huyssteen writes,
Hawking’s cosmology essentially tries to avoid this question and argues
that the cosmos may not have a beginning in time, in which case we would
not be needing the God hypothesis. (van Huyssteen 1998a, 58)
Hawking’s proposed solution is the Grand Unified Theory (Hawking 1998, 41). This
theory (which remains undiscovered,) would unify the behaviours of strong nuclear
forces, electromagnetic forces, and weak forces. Once unified in strength, these forces
could be seen as three aspects of the same source. Currently, there exists no method or
facility to test the theory, as the proposed energy requirements are simply too great.
However, Hawking’s desire to deny the existence of a beginning, and therefore God,
depends on a leap of faith:
...if we do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable
in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all,
philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people, be able to take part in
the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. If
we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human
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reason – for then we would know the mind of God (Hawking and
Mlodinow 2010, 94).
Hawking’s statement reveals a number of interesting anomalies about his unwillingness
to entertain theological dialogue: first, his statement regarding the results of a ‘theory of
everything’ invites philosophers and ordinary people to take part in public existential
reasoning. Surely such a conversation would include both philosophers and ordinary
people, but one may question why Hawking does not invite theologians in on the
discussion. Surely, by nature of their vocation, theologians would read and interpret this
revelation from their own unique perspectives. In the words of David Tracy,
Every theologian provides both interpretations of a religious tradition and
interpretations of the religious dimension of the contemporary situation.
Every theologian, therefore, provides some interpretation of the meaning
and meaningfulness of the religious tradition for the present situation.
(Tracy 1981, 61-62)
Second, Hawking seems to assume that the rejection of a definitive beginning to the
universe as we know it will end theological discussion and response. What he fails to
acknowledge is that Christian theology professes a God who was, is, and ever shall be
(world without end). Belief in an infinite and eternal God, much less eternal life, opens
up the possibility of endless theological responses to the metaphysical proposals of
modern physics, whether they include non-linear time, multiple dimensions, or extraterrestrial life. Hawking’s scientism seems to rely on a mistakenly stereotypical view of
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the Christian theologian: dogmatic, literal and unchanging, and unable to make use of
constructive rationality. Hawking’s only real enemy is religious fundamentalism.
Van Huyssteen responds:
This much, however, is clear: the kind of God Hawking is rejecting is a
kind of God that would fit our contemporary cosmology and our current
scientific theories, a God that is ultimately needed to explain whatever still
remains unexplained in science. This, however, is the typical (deistic)
God-of-the-gaps that by no stretch of the imagination qualifies as the God
of the Christian faith. This kind of God seems to be only a philosophical,
abstract, first cause, and provides us with a ‘divine’ explanation whenever
scientists fail to give us a ‘natural’ explanation. It is also, of course, a
classic deistic notion of God, where God brings the cosmos into existence
at the beginning and then leaves it to run according to its built-in natural
laws. The Christian, theistic notion of God is, however, radically different:
whatever God, as Creator of the universe, did at the beginning, God is still
active and present in the events and history of our universe. (van
Huyssteen 1998a, 63-64)
Whatever the case, Huyssteen’s analysis of Hawking’s response to theology reveals a
particular danger in any attempt to participate in interdisciplinary dialogue. The risk is
that the theologian (or the scientist, for that matter) may be tempted to fall back on the
‘god of the gaps,’ as described by Drees:

69

Whatever strength scientific explanations have, there always remain limit
questions about reality and about understanding. These may evoke an
attitude of wonder and gratitude. Even when phenomena within the world
are understandable in a naturalistic way, the world as thus understood may
be interpreted from a religious perspective as dependent on, or created by,
a transcendent source. (Drees 1995, 236-237)
The theologian who hopes for an equal partner in interdisciplinary work will find that
resorting to the “god of the gaps” will not only degrade the position of theology in such a
relationship, but will find that as science makes progress, God’s perceived role in the
world will also become lesser and lesser. Eventually, both the scientist and theologian
will find themselves asking the question, “do we need God anymore?”
Having witnessed the religious criticism and wide public support of Stephen Hawking,
Richard Dawkins, and others, one might ask: can we hope for any productive
interdisciplinary work between science and theology, especially in controversial areas
such as theology? Is Van Huyssteen realistic in his expectations?

3.3 The Postfoundational Model
In the book, Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Dialogue,
Gregersen and Van Huyssteen assure us that this interdisciplinary work is not only
plausible, but that it is alive and well around the world (Gregersen and van Huyssteen
1998, 1). One might immediately think of a number of leading scientist-theologians:
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Peacocke; Barbour; Polkinghorne. However, this sort of interdisciplinary work remains
something of a specialty.
Van Huyssteen provides a particularly interesting model for dialogue. His
postfoundationalist proposal is refreshing, and might not only allow theologians,
scientists, and the general public to leave some particularly unhelpful baggage behind,
but might even allow for a rediscovery and revisioning of both scientific and theological
truths.
Van Huyssteen suggests that a number of stereotypes have continued to fuel the
polarization between science and theology. He lists the following assumptions as
obstacles to be overcome:


scientific statements are hypothetical, fallible, and tentative, while statements of
religious faith are dogmatic, ideological, and fideistic;



scientific thought is always open to critical evaluation, justification, or
falsification, while religious faith goes against the facts and often defies empirical
evidence;



scientific thought delights in critical dissent and constructive criticism, while faith
more often than not depends on massive consensus and uncritical commitment;



scientists therefore seem to base their beliefs on evidence and rational argument,
while religious beliefs appear to be founded on “faith” only;



scientific rationality is thus revealed as not only a very manicured and disciplined
form of human reflection, but as also incommensurable with, and vastly superior
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to, religious faith and theological reflection. (Gregersen and van Huyssteen 1998,
15)
One might recognize the assumptions as the stereotypes implied in Hawking’s A Brief
History in Time (though one might debate the stereotype of scientific fallibility):
assumptions seldom spoken or acknowledged, but ingrained deeply within our society.
The natural sciences continue to be perceived as “the paradigm and apex of human
rationality” (Gregersen and van Huyssteen 1998, 14). Meanwhile, theology continues to
be intellectually marginalized: a phenomenon Tracy suggests results in “the short-run
enchantment of self-fulfillment and the long-run despair of societal bankruptcy” (Tracy
1981, 14).
Lest we believe that the postmodern condition affects only theologians, Van Huyssteen
reminds us that there have been recent criticisms (Moore, Wertheim) of the scientific
community, as well. The world of science remains one of patriarchy, which he maintains
continues to be isolated from feminist critique (Gregersen and van Huyssteen 1998, 1819). It seems important, for our purposes, to note Van Huyssteen’s observation that
science’s “modernist, foundationalist metanarrative... reveals itself primarily in science’s
innate conviction that natural scientific rationality is not only superior, but in its
controlling, patriarchal grasp can actually claim to know and understand everything, and
as such be totally rational, logical, and objective” (Gregersen and van Huyssteen 1998,
18).
In other words, science (or perhaps more accurately, scientism,) paints the natural world
as a single grand narrative: one reality, one experience, one interpretation, one truth. This
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same rationality resembles religion at its worst. What postmodern thinking like the
aforementioned feminist critique challenges both science and theology with is the
necessity of avoiding fundamentalism (in both religion and science) by looking beyond
privatized discipline and experience: even to consider interdisciplinary work, as both seek
to understand the world.
Van Huysteen proposes what he calls a postfoundationalist model of rationality. This
implies what could require drastic change for both the scientist and the theologian.
Rejecting assumed authority, in either case, would mean rejecting privatized and internal
assumptions about truths. Participating in dialectic inquiry under these terms would often
mean looking to other disciplines for answers.
While a postfoundationalist model may first seem daunting, it may be the most logical
step forward. Both modern science and theology are internally pluralistic. Therefore, any
claims on authority are already born into conflict. And if it is true that theological
reflection is shaped by functioning within a pluralistic and interdisciplinary landscape,
and that the culture of our world is shaped by a scientific rationality (Gregersen and van
Huyssteen 1998, 42), then fruitful theological reflection can be shaped only by interaction
with science.
Van Huyssteen respectfully concludes that “science can still, but only in a very qualified
sense, be seen as the clearest available example we have of the cognitive dimension of
human rationality at work (Gregersen and van Huyssteen 1998, 43). However, he
reminds us that this does not imply superiority over other forms of rationality, but simply
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expertise in cognition: a resource to be shared with other disciplines as they share their
own perspectives and rationalities.
But perhaps Van Huyssteen’s most challenging and accurate observation lies in his
description of what both scientists and theologians share:


the crucial role of being a rational agent, and of having to make the best possible
judgements within a specific context, and within and for a specific community;



the epistemological fallibilism implied by contextual decision making



the experiential and interpretative dimension of all our knowledge



the fact, therefore, that neither science nor theology can ever have demonstrably
certain foundations (Gregersen and van Huyssteen 1998, 37)

Few would deny that these observations ring true of both scientists and theologians. The
challenge, however, is whether those in both disciplines can be honest enough,
postfoundationalist enough to live as if these observations are true. Epistemological
fallibilism looks good on paper; it even relieves those in both disciplines of the tension of
an impossible task. But can we live and interact as if this is true? The same may be asked
of our experiential and interpretive knowledge. Are we willing and able to look beyond
our own experience? Finally, we must ask if we are willing to let go of our foundations,
at least those regarding the observations in disciplines that overlap. Christian foundations
have morphed and changed (or dare we say, evolved,) over time. The same is true for the
natural sciences. But are we willing to allow our foundations to be shaped across
disciplines? For our purposes, as we seek to understand the resurrection, are we willing to
let go of body-soul dualism?
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If so, Van Huyssteen suggests that we can move beyond understanding our differences as
obstacles to interdisciplinary work, and begin to look at specific differences as
advantages for shared insight: namely, epistemological focus, experiential scope, and
heuristic structures (Gregersen and van Huyssteen 1998, 44).

3.4 Postfoundationalism in Practice
While Van Huysteen’s proposal is eloquent, one may question whether the execution of
his method is realistic, or even possible. On the other hand, given the current trajectory
our pluralistic landscape, it seems likely that postfoundationalist reasoning alone may
allow theologians to overcome polarization, and to participate in public discourse with
sciences.
Rather than simply developing a model, Van Huysteen has used and published work
demonstrating this interdisciplinary reasoning, most notably in his book of lectures,
Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology. Here, we will briefly
consider his method for interdisciplinary dialogue with a working example of the model.
In what may seem a bold, and perhaps even a foolish move, Van Huysteen explores one
of the very cornerstones of Christian theology: the imago Dei. But his concerns are very
real: human uniqueness, long assumed to reflect God’s image, has been called into
question. Not only have the natural sciences blurred former boundaries between humanity
and other creatures (i.e. apes, chimpanzees,) but cultural and religious pluralism has
reminded us that the concept of human superiority is not universally accepted. But as
public understanding changes, the theologian’s role remains the same: one of
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interpretation, speaking both from and to the public sphere. In that light, Van Huysteen
looks beyond theology as he considers the significance of the idea of human uniqueness
in Christian theology, the biblical account of creation in God’s image, and how the
concept’s meaning has changed over time (van Huyssteen 2004, loc 1707).
However, despite the necessity of interdisciplinary study, Van Huyssteen stresses the
importance of identifying, contextually, the theological problem of human uniqueness as
a backdrop for discussion (van Huyssteen 2004, loc 1753). The canonical tradition, he
notes, is always the starting point, though it should never be argued in abstraction from
the concrete historical and social context in which we find ourselves (van Huyssteen
2004, loc 1734)23.

This being the case, Van Huyssteen begins with the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. A
careful reading of the creation story reveals humanity as those created in God’s image:
“... walking representations of God, in no sense superior to other animals, and with an
additional call to responsible care and stewardship to the world, also to our sister species
in this world” (van Huyssteen 2004, loc 2421, loc 4654). He draws on the Genesis 3 text:
“Then the Lord said, ‘See, the human being has become like one of us, knowing good
and evil” (van Huyssteen 2004, loc 2423). From the text, he interprets the created
humanity as a moral creature, with the gift of reason, much as a contemporary biblical
scholar might do, using the tools of biblical criticism. Finally, Van Huyssteen looks to
Jesus of Nazareth, who, like the first humans, defined a unique relationship between

23

See also The Christian Classic, Tracy, 248-
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humanity and God (van Huyssteen 2004, loc 2426, loc 2428). The imago Dei, to Van
Huyssteen, describes the creation of a humanity that shares in a unique relationship with
God, possesses the gifts of reason and of moral awareness, and holds a unique
responsibility of care for creation and for other creatures:
The image of God, therefore, is not simply human beings in relational
dialogue or in plural sociality. It is found in men and women of flesh and
blood who exercise responsible care as they multiply and spread over the
earth. This obviously includes the fact that at the same time they also live
in relationships with one another in ways that are dialogical and socially
open. (van Huyssteen 2004, loc 2328)
At first glance, Van Huyssteen’s analysis seems no different than the sort of exegesis any
other theological or clergyperson might take part in. It is important to note, however, that
in his interpretation, no claims are made that could be seen to be in conflict with what
scientific research has already revealed to the world. Van Huyssteen does not rest on
literalism or fundamentalism, but rather interprets the classic Christian text into the
context in which we live—one informed by science. Still, he is quick to remind us that
the canonical tradition is the basis for dialogue across disciplines:
Against this background the notion of the imago Dei still functions
theologically to express a crucial link between God and humans, and
should give Christian theologians intradisciplinary grounds for redefining
notions of evil, sin, and redemption within Christian theology (van
Huyssteen 2004, loc 2426, loc 2428).
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In an interesting exploration of the Christian tradition, Van Huyssteen proceeds to survey
the diverse interpretations of the imago Dei across the ages: one with intellect and
rationality; one who loves and loves itself; praying creatures; co-creators with God;
united in community; and so forth. He does so not as a search for the proper
interpretation (recognizing that all interpretations are historically and culturally
contextual), but to make a transversal interpretation. That is, he makes a common
connection between the interpretations that have allowed the imago Dei to exist not
simply as an abstract notion, but as a concrete symbol for use in human life. He
concludes,
An imaginative, embodied interpretation of the imago Dei specifically
directs us toward recognizing that our very human disposition or ability
for ultimate religious meaning is deeply embedded in our species’
symbolic, imaginative behaviour, specifically in religious ritual as that
specific embodiment of discourse with God and with one another. (van
Huyssteen 2004, loc 2428)
As he continues his reflection, Van Huyssteen reaches to interdisciplinary work: namely,
feminism—a field that has long identified the imago Dei as an oppressive theological
doctrine. He draws us back to the text, reminding us that both male and female were
created in the image of God, a textual detail often ignored in earlier generations (van
Huyssteen 2004, loc 1990). While for most theologians, this reading and interpretation
are likely accepted, it remains the case that many in this world still use the Genesis
accounts of creation as rationale for discrimination or abuse against women. Van
Huyssteen brings the feminist voices into his reinterpretation of the imago Dei to point us
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to the power of interdisciplinary work: by adopting and interpreting the work of
anthropologists, archaeologists, language scholars and feminists, the theologian is in a
unique position to interpret classic text into contemporary context. Van Huyssteen says,
On this view the liberating character of the imago Dei is revealed as a
theological move away from speculative abstraction and toward embodied
human persons, and as a powerful symbol that points to justice, liberation,
and reconciliation. (van Huyssteen 2004, loc 2428)
While many of Van Huyssteen’s conclusions in this particular dialogue are shared with
other theologians, his approach is unique. What contrasts most with others is his adoption
of postfoundationalist reasoning. And though this methodology requires that the
theologian begin on level ground with science and other disciplines, Van Huyssteen does
not allow either his interpretation or his response to resort to ‘the God of the gaps.’
Allowing the natural sciences to answer the specific questions regarding the manner in
which God created the earth, and the means by which humanity developed, he maintains
his role as theologian: interpreter of the canons of scripture. But by speaking both from
and to the dominant culture (science), he is able to interpret meaning in the classic text
that not only avoids the ‘God of the gaps,’ but continues to provide helpful and unique
answers to questions science and other disciplines cannot: what is our relationship with
God? In what ways are humans spiritually or intellectually unique? What relationship do
we have with creation and other creatures? What does the tradition have to say about the
relationship between men and women?

79

With few exceptions, the theologians of our day have failed to participate in continuing
discourse with the scientific community. This may be because many feel poorly educated
or ill-equipped to engage in scientific research or dialogue. However, it seems more
likely that most avoid this interdisciplinary dialogue for lack of an appropriate model
with which to do so. Postfoundationalism provides a certain freedom for theologians:
asking only that they do theology, in dialogue with experts in science and other fields.
And in that sense, this kind of interdisciplinary sharing of knowledge differs from
Thomistic synderesis: a habitual (rather than actual) human property Linda Hogan
describes as, “a natural, inborn and indestructible inclination or habit of practical reason
which allows us to discern the fundamental principles or natural law,” (Hogan 2006, 132133) because it implies that both theologians and scientists can be incorrect. Humans of
all disciplines need one another—because no field has either the tools or the “habit of
practical reason” for exhaustive understanding.
It remains, then, the responsibility of the theologian (and those of other disciplines) to
develop public, not private criteria and discourse. While acknowledging that theology
should engage and be engaged by the public at all levels, this chapter has identified
theology’s general reluctance and inability to allow science to be part of this ongoing
dialogue (and vice-versa). It has looked specifically to the work of J. Wentzel van
Huyssteen for a model which suggests not only discourse, but interdisciplinary work.
Finally, it looked to Van Huyssteen’s reinterpretation of the imago Dei in his most recent
book, Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology, as an application
of this proposed interdisciplinary theology.
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Chapter 4

4

Postfoundationalism Applied, Conclusions

4.1 Resurrection, in Dialogue with Science
The problem, for theologians, seems to be daunting: we have inherited a tradition that,
despite having informed Western society for generations in regards to human form and its
relationship with God and creation, has fallen behind. As Nancey Murphy observed, “the
neurosciences have completed the Darwinian revolution, bringing the entire human being
under the purview of the natural sciences” (Murphy 1998a, 24). If Tracy is correct (and I
believe he is), in that theology must speak both from and to three publics: society,
academy, and church (Tracy 1981, ix), then it seems our refusal or inability to engage
with the natural sciences has only aggravated the problem.
A postfoundational model provides an elegant solution: not only would it demand that
theologians engage with science, but it would provide theologians the freedom to accept
their limits, respecting the work of scientists as the rational conclusions of experts in their
fields, rather than as threat to religious tradition.
The primary question for our purposes, as we apply the postfoundational model, is this:
does Christian theology require the soul? I propose that there are two answers to the
question, as well framed by Warren Brown’s description of the soul:
…two theological uses of the concept of soul, one as that substantial entity
that survives death, and the other as a designator of our deepest
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experiences of personal relatedness. The theological status of a human
person with respect to eternal life need not be dependent on a pre-existing
nonphysical soul but on God’s re-creation in another space and time;
whereas soul-as-experience is embodied, emerging out of personal
relatedness. (Brown 1998a, loc 1721)
These two distinct uses are not unfamiliar: in fact, they seem similar to the two souls
described by Richard Dawkins in chapter 1.2. That distinction between the two is
important for our purposes, because the first use relates to life after death—though here,
Brown does not distinguish between the eternal soul and the re-created soul. The second
use refers to human capacity for relationship with the Creator and the creation, as
experienced in this material and embodied life.
Keith Ward unpacks Brown’s view:
Warren Brown argues that there is no need to introduce any such entity as
the soul, which he sees as an immaterial agent. Mental acts are causally
influenced by neural systems to a very great extent. There is very little
left, he says for an allegedly immaterial “soul” to do. “The concept of a
nonmaterial human ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ as a causal force within the mental
and behavioral life of a person is difficult to reconcile with what can be
demonstrated scientifically about the impact of changes in brain systems
on thought and behavior.” (Ward 2008, 156)
The short answer, at least in terms of Brown’s second definition, is no. It seems there is
little theological need for the immaterial soul. Neurological research has explored and

82

explained much of human emotion, sensory experience, social and relational capability.
For the theologian, this is reason to celebrate: the creation of material beings with the
capacity to love, to feel, and to relate not only with one another, but with their Creator
who is spirit, is a wonderful thing! However, the first definition is more problematic: it
seems that the persistence of body-soul dualism in the life of the Church is most directly
related to believers’ hope to share in the resurrection. For those who lived and died in the
generations that followed the Early Church (which inherited not only Hebrew tradition,
but Greek philosophy among other ideals), the desire for one’s person to exist after death
until the time of the general resurrection was met by a dualistic theology: one that
allowed the soul to perdure without the body. However, I will propose that here, too, the
answer is no—because there is no need for the person, or soul, to exist between death and
resurrection.
As examined in chapter 2, the solution to the problem is almost surely a return to the
Hebraic views that shaped the culture Jesus and the Apostles inherited, and that revealed
in a certain reading of Pauline Epistles, as the Early Church discerned how best to
understand the promise of resurrection.
For us, that means reclaiming the finality and certainty of death. Levenson writes:
To some modern people, this sad observation may be greeted with a
certain joy. Those displaying the characteristic modern skepticism about
the traditional doctrines of resurrection, whether in their Jewish or their
Christian form, for example, can thus find in the Hebrew Bible a resource
for religious justification for their own naturalism. In this approach, the
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Hebrew Bible is interpreted to support the idea that death is natural,
irreversible, and most important, altogether in accordance with God’s
will… (Levenson 2006, 166)
Do I suggest that Christians live without hope? By no means! Scruton touches on the
hope present in the finality of death:
Here, it seems to me, is a way faith verges on hope. We can shun death as
an annihilation, or greet it as a transition. We can see it as a loss of
something precious, or as the gain of another way of being. It is, in a
sense, up to us. When we live in full awareness and acceptance of our
mortality, we see the world as making a place for us. We open ourselves to
death, and accept death as our completion. (Scruton 2014, 196)
And further, the Christian faith looks to hope in the resurrection. But just as Brown
suggested two different uses for the word soul, I will suggest two uses of the word
resurrection. The first applies specifically to the general resurrection: the belief that
through Christ, God will resurrect the faithful, as realized in the Nicene Creed:
We look for the resurrection of the dead,
and the life of the world to come.
And as Brown suggests, the general resurrection is dependent not on the persistence of
the eternal soul, but rather on God’s re-creation in another space and time. If we believe
that God is God, then recomposing those who have died is hardly a problem (especially
given the scriptures’ reference to new bodies and new creation). In fact, the general

84

resurrection opens the theological imagination to infinite possibilities, especially for
those in dialogue with the scientific community. Where do material beings go, when they
return to the earth? What do death and new life look like, for those who understand that
matter is never destroyed, but only converted into other forms? What possibilities do new
understandings around the relationships between time and space, or matter and energy
provide? While it seems unlikely that interdisciplinary dialogue on this topic will be
bilateral, the theologian is sure to step into the sort of metaphysical and creative work that
Delfino described in chapter 3.1. In that same creative spirit, Hans Küng writes:
I do not believe in the later legendary elaboration of the New Testament
message of the resurrection but in its original core: that this Jesus of
Nazareth did not die into nothingness, but into God. So trusting in this
message, I hope as a Christian, like many people in other religions, not to
die into nothingness, which seems to me to be extremely irrational and
senseless. Rather, I hope to die into the ultimate reality, into God, which—
beyond space and time in the hidden dimension of the infinite—transcends
all human reasoning and conceiving. (Küng 2007, loc. 2346)
The general resurrection is shrouded in mystery—but as we look beyond what can see
and touch within the boundaries of this life, interdisciplinary dialogue prevents us from
falling back on the “god of the gaps”: here, theologians are invited into the imaginative
visions of physics and cosmology.
The second use is that commonly understood by Christians who seek the kingdom in the
here-and-now—a theology that has taken on many names: living in the resurrection,
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Easter people, the Jesus movement. To live in the resurrection, then, is to live in
relationship with the God who is spirit—the same God present in Jesus of Nazareth, and
who continues to live in relationship with the creation, undefeated by the finality of
death.24 For if we can accept, as it seems that the Hebrews and some in the Early Church
did, that there is no immaterial part of the human person that remains after death, then we
can come to only one conclusion: this life matters. Relationships matter, peace matters,
love matters, healing matters, the creation matters, people matter. If the human soul is, as
Ray Anderson describes it, “that which represents the whole person as a physical,
personal, and spiritual being, especially the inner core of an individual’s life as created
and upheld by God” (Anderson 1998, 193), then it seems that the resurrected life is one
that is lived with concern for the things that oppose death. Anderson likens this to
“concern for the soul,” as portrayed by Thomas Moore:
Concern for the “soul”… does not necessitate a view of the soul as a
separate mental or spiritual entity alongside or within the body. Rather,
concern for the soul is concern for the quality of human life at the deepest
core of our existential life, at the center of the ecology of our physical life
as life in the cosmos, in the manifestation of the divine image in our
manifold social relations, and as the spiritual beings that we are by the
breath of God’s Spirit. (Anderson 1998, 194)

24

As noted early in this paper, we have limited the scope of this discussion to the general resurrection,
assuming that Jesus’ resurrection is an entirely different matter. However, Christian materialists should
continue to explore the ways human ontology reflects and differs from the Christological/Trinitarian model.
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It is in this both/and living of the already-but-not-yet resurrected life that we share in
Christ’s resurrection. Jesus taught his followers about the coming kingdom, but also said,
The Kingdom of God is not coming with things that can be observed; nor
will they say, “Look, here it is!” or “There it is!” For, in fact, the kingdom
of God is among you. (Luke 17:20-21)
To live the earthly resurrected life, then, is to join in the life of the one who overcame
death:
God’s Kingdom is the antithesis of all oppression, domination,
manipulation… a condition of well-being, justice, mutuality of concern,
harmony between all creatures, gratitude for being… the gospel means:
stewarding life! (Hall 1988, 16)

4.2 Conclusions
Christianity is plagued by two dualistic concepts: first, an ontological dualism that
divides the human person into body and soul, and second, the concept that perpetuates
this misunderstanding, an epistemological dualism that claims science and theology are
incompatible. However, these polarized (and polarizing) theological frameworks are no
longer sufficient, especially as scientific research provides new understanding about the
brain and human identity. The existence of the nonphysical soul has long been called into
question, thereby creating a theological crisis at the very core of Christian belief: the
resurrection.
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In the first chapter, this thesis examined the crisis as it manifests itself in contemporary
Christian society, pointing to the perpetuation of dualistic philosophies as the source of a
theological impasse. It observed a body-soul dualism that leaves Christian theology in
conflict with the scientific community, and examined an age-old science-theology
dualism that has stalled progress in regards to Christianity’s redefinition of what we call
the soul. It introduced the holistic, Pauline understanding of the human person, as well as
the certainty of death present in the Hebrew Scriptures.
In the second chapter, one major source of Western Christianity’s views on the soul was
identified, as Thomas Aquinas’ Treatise on Man was explored. Thomas’ work was
challenged by Bynum, and in turn, we turned to the Hebrew scriptures, seeking a
theology of death and resurrection present before Jesus and the Early Church.
Finally, the third chapter asked how interdisciplinary dialogue between science and
theology might help us to solve the problem of body-soul dualism, thereby providing a
way forward in terms of resurrection theology. It heard Delfino’s proposal about
science’s dependence on metaphysics, then turning to Wentzel van Huyssteen, and to his
postfoundational method for interdisciplinary dialogue.
Having considered the issue from all these different angles: the current theological crisis,
the basis of the classical body-soul, matter form nexus, the beliefs of the Early Church
and the Hellenistic Jews, and by exploring new methods of interdisciplinary dialogue, our
conclusions are simple: we need not perpetuate the divide between science and theology.
By way of interdisciplinary dialogue, like that enabled by van Huyssteen’s
postfoundational method, theologians can both accept the gifts presented by scientists
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who work within their respective disciplines, and speak both from and to the culture that
surrounds them as they interpret new discoveries in light of scripture and tradition. In that
light, it seems that body-soul dualism is no longer useful, but that the assessment of the
holistic human is: it is a model more easily reconciled with a growing body of
neurological research that identifies soul-like qualities in the brain.

Finally, the disposal of these dualistic tendencies leaves room for the theology of the
resurrection: in fact, it solves a good number of problems. Without an immaterial soul,
the theologian has no need to explain the location of the person between the event of
death and the general resurrection. Death becomes a final and natural end (save for the
resurrection), and alongside that permanence, life itself becomes all the more urgent: a
time where the appreciation for and stewardship of that life—ours, and that of all
creation—is of utmost importance for those who live in the resurrection.

Until He comes.
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